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The values, attitudes, and beliefs which humans hold regarding 
mankind's role in the universe must be understood if the natural 
environment is to be preserved. In this study, the utility of the 
construct "anthropocentrism" as an organizing principle for understand­
ing consistencies among individuals' attitudes regarding man's role in 
nature was explored. Anthropocentrism was defined as a doctrine which 
posits humanity as the center of the universe and sees the well being 
of mankind as the ultimate purpose of things. The various attitudinal 
manifestations and historical roots of anthropocentrism were explored, 
and the sparse empirical literature relevant to this construct was 
reviewed. Subsequently, the construct validity of "anthropocentrism" 
was empirically investigated, as was the validity of the operational 
measure of this construct, the Anthropocentrism Scale.
A factor analysis using a principal components method with a 
varimax rotation yielded nine factors. Most relevant to the construct 
validity of "anthropocentrism" was the finding of a "pure anthropocen­
trism" first factor. This factor contained high loadings for items which 
directly state the central anthropocentric value judgement; that man is 
the most important entity in the universe. The centrality of this 
value judgement within the anthropocentric ideology was thereby demon­
strated. Correlational data indicated that anthropocentrism is unre­
lated to attitudes toward humanity per se, but rather, that 
anthropocentrism is a construct which refers to the value attributed to 
man relative to the value attributed to the nonhuman environment. A
vi
moderate positive correlation was obtained between anthropocentrism and 
ethnocentrism, indicating that anthropocentrism may represent an exten­
sion of ethnocentric thinking. In other words, ethnocentric individuals 
are likely to identify with mankind as an ingroup only if provided with 
a suitable outgroup which can be devalued, such as the nonhuman environ­
ment. Contrary to expectation, anthropocentrism was found to be 
unrelated to egocentrism and locus of control. Anthropocentrism was 
also explored in terms of man-nature value orientations (man-under/with/ 
or over-nature), and various reported behaviors. It was concluded that 
anthropocentrism is a useful construct for understanding values 
regarding man-nature interactions, and that the relation of this con­
struct to other constructs and actual behaviors should be explored 
further.
The Anthropocentrism Scale was found to be unaffected by social 
desirability set. In addition, variance attributable to irrelevant 
content was found to be excessive, though not extensive. It was con­
cluded that this scale is currently an adequate measure of anthropo­
centrism, though a better scale may be possible as the universe of 
attitudinal and behavioral manifestations of anthropocentrism becomes 
better delineated. Finally, it was recommended that Factor 1 be 
employed as a measure of "pure anthropocentrism," thereby complementing 
the use of total score on the Anthropocentrism Scale.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, man has become increasingly aware of the inter­
dependence among components of nature, as well as the impact of man's 
accelerating environmental control upon this balance. In a study 
which formed the foundation for the research reported herein, Chandler 
(Note 1) examined the utility of the construct "anthropocentrism" for 
understanding the basis of observed consistencies among individuals' 
attitudes regarding man's perceived role in the natural world. In 
accordance with Eysenck and Arnold (1972), anthropocentrism was de­
fined as "A doctrine or theory which elevates man as the center of the 
world, and sees the well being of humanity as the ultimate purpose of 
things." The 1978 Chandler study involved an examination of the 
relatedness of various attitudes which supposedly reflect an anthropo­
centric outlook, and resulted in the development of an operational 
measure of anthropocentrism (see Appendix A). The purpose of the 
present study was to accumulate additional data relevant to the con­
struct validity of anthropocentrism as well as the validity of its 
operational measure, the Anthropocentrism Scale. In the process of 
accumulating validity data, evidence was also collected regarding 
certain motives which may contribute to the adoption of anthropocen­
tric attitudes. Before proceeding further, however, an examination of 
various facets and historical roots of an anthropocentric ideology is 
in order. For this purpose, speculative and empirical literature 
available on the topic of anthropocentrism are reviewed below.
First of all, the foundation of an anthropocentric stance
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involves a subjective statement of value postulating man (i.e., 
humanity, mankind) as the most important of all forms of life. Sub­
scription to this value judgement is, by definition, the sina qua non 
of a truly anthropocentric ideology. A given individual may recog­
nize the subjective nature of the valuation process, or he may 
unwittingly project his conviction of human preeminence, considering 
it to be part of the natural order. In either case, however, this 
value judgement forms the core of an anthropocentric stance. This 
contention was empirically substantiated by results of the Chandler 
study showing that the two items which explicitly state this 
value judgement (Item #6: "Man is the most important species on
earth," and item #29: "Man is the most significant entity in the uni­
verse") ranked first (.660) and third (.596) respectively in average 
item-test correlations among items appearing on the initial three 
forms of the Anthropocentrism Scale (see Appendix B). In a related 
vein, it might be noted that the two items explicitly stating a belief 
in human "superiority" (Item #14, "Humans are superior to all other 
animals in all important respects," and item #22, "No matter how we 
define 'superiority,' it seems that man must be considered superior to 
all known forms of life") ranked second (.634) and fourth (.590) 
respectively in average item-test correlation. In this regard, it 
should be noted that like the word "important," "superiority" is a 
term heavily laden with positive connotative value. Its denotation is 
ambiguous, and fully surfaces only by reference to the criteria used 
to judge superiority, the selection of which is rather arbitrary, sub­
jective, and potentially self-enhancing. The above results indicating
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the centrality of value laden items referring to human importance and 
superiority lend support to the contention that "human preeminence" 
is the central value underlying the varied attitudinal complex termed 
anthropocentrism. Focus will now be shifted to the variety of atti­
tudes, beliefs, and behaviors which tend to be associated with this 
central value judgement.
Elder (1970) distinguished between the "exclusionist" and "in-
clusionist" schools of thought regarding the relation between man and
the rest of nature. Regarding the relative degree of anthropocentrism
in these two contrasting philosophies, Elder summarized,
First and foremost, obviously, is the fact that the exclusionists 
concentrate on man and make him the measure of all creation.
Even the theologians who ultimately focus on God present God as 
'support datum1 for the activity and centrality of man. Over 
against this the inclusionists refuse to make man such a single 
center of attention. They do not demean man and his activities; 
they simply say that an overconcentration on humanity ignores 
the importance of life in its full variety and, paradoxically, 
ultimately works against the welfare of man (Elder, 1970, pp. 
78-79).
In addition to the marked anthropocentric bias in the exclusionist 
tradition, a dualism between man and environment can be detected. Such 
a dualism between man and nature can be viewed as a natural outgrowth 
of a dualistic view of man himself in terms of mind and matter, or 
body and soul (O'Briant, 1974), with man's intellectual and spiritual 
capacity being considered distinctly human. A topic to be discussed 
later might be anticipated at this point by noting that the tendency of 
Elder's exclusionist school to emphasize the differences, rather than 
the similarities and interrelations between man and nature, is reminis­
cent of the ethnocentric individual's set to perceive others in terms 
of group membership. Compared with exclusionists, the less
4
anthropocentric inclusionist school tends to think of man iji the en­
vironment, that is, man as an inextricable element in the complex, 
holistic web of nature. Elder also noted that a persistent theme among 
inclusionists, besides holism and equalitarianism, is an emphasis upon 
the uniqueness of the individual (reminiscent of the nonethnocentric 
individual's readiness to respond interpersonally on the basis of 
individual differences rather than group membership). Results from 
the Chandler study support Elder's view that anthropocentrism tends to 
be associated with a dualistic view of man and the environment 
(average item-test correlation* of .540 for item #12: "It is best to
think of man as just one of many members of the animal world") in 
which differences rather than similarities between man and other forms 
of life are emphasized (average item-test correlation of .380 for 
item #1: "The differences between human beings and animals are more
numerous than the similarities").
In one of the few empirical studies pertaining to anthropocen­
trism, Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) examined the value orienta­
tions of five culturally distinctive communities in the Rimrock region 
of the American Southwest. They employed a five item instrument to 
investigate values regarding the relationship between man and nature, 
with each item requiring the respondent to indicate his preference 
between three different approaches to a concrete issue of man-nature 
relations. These three approaches respectively involved man in
*The scoring of all negatively phrased items is reversed, with 
the result that a high score on any item is indicative of an anthropo­
centric response. Thus, all item-test correlations are positive.
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subjugation to nature, in harmony with nature (analogous to Elder's 
inclusionist tradition), or with mastery over nature (analogous to 
Elder's exclusionist tradition). Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck found that 
the subjugated-to-nature value orientation was significantly preferred 
only in the Spanish-American village they sampled, and described this 
orientation as involving a fatalistic acceptance of illness, death, and 
natural disaster. They described the mastery-over-nature position as 
involving a belief that natural forces of all kinds are to be overcome 
and put to the use of human beings, a belief in man-made medical 
care for the control of illness and lengthening of life, an attitude 
that "the Lord helps those who help themselves," and a strong empha­
sis on the use of technology to fulfill man's duty to overcome 
obstacles. This value orientation was found to be the preferred 
position among the English speaking communities sampled by Kluckhohn 
and Strodbeck. In a community of homesteaders originally from 
Texas and Oklahoma, the man-over-nature orientation was significantly 
preferred over the two alternative positions. In a Mormon village, 
the man-over-nature and harmony-with-nature positions were sig­
nificantly preferred over the subjugation-to-nature orientation.
The harmony-with-nature orientation was more prominent, though not 
clearly predominant, among the two American Indian cultures sampled. 
This orientation maintains that there is no real separation of man, 
nature, and the supernatural; rather, one is simply an extension of 
the other, with a sense of wholeness emerging from the unity of these 
components. Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck add that this orientation 
appears to have been dominant in many periods of Chinese history, and
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is strongly evident in past and present Japanese culture. Among the 
cultures sampled, the harmony-with-nature position was found to be 
significantly preferred over the subjugation-to-nature position among 
members of a decentralized Navaho Indian band. Otherwise, differ­
ences among value orientations were insignificant, both in the Navaho 
community, and among a highly centralized pueblo of Zuni Indians.
Translating this triad of value orientations into terms used 
herein, the highly anthropocentric man-over-nature orientation was 
found to characterize the English speaking, northern European 
extract cultures studied.. On the other hand, the less Westernized 
Spanish-American and American Indian cultures tended to prefer a 
relatively nonanthropocentric stance, whether it be the subjugated- 
to-nature position, or the harmony-with-nature position. While the 
meaning of low scores on the Anthropocentrism Scale will be discussed 
later, it is important to note at this point that there are at least 
two nonanthropocentric stances: a somewhat fatalistic (or perhaps
even misanthropic) view that man is rightfully subjugated to nature, 
and the more omnicentric view that man is inextricably related to and 
preferably in harmony with the whole of nature.
While the topology and results of Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's 
study are quite informative, their research suffers from methodologi­
cal weaknesses involving failure to report internal consistency, 
reliability, and validity data for their five-item questionnaire. A 
more recent study by Kameron (1975) used the same man over-with-under 
nature typology as its departure point, but involved considerably more 
sophistication methodologically. Accordingly, this study will be
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reviewed in detail. Kameron started with 267 items representing the 
"over,11 "with," and "under" man-nature value orientations, with judges 
subaequently eliminating ambiguous or irrelevant items to produce a 182 
item scale. This scale was then factor analyzed, and reduced to the 93 
items which loaded highest on the obtained factors. The 93 item scale 
was again factor analyzed, and produced eight orthogonal factors, 
accounting for 25.7% of the total variance in the data. The man over- 
with-under typology was found capable of describing the major portion 
of the majority of factors, as might be expected given the use of this 
typology to generate the initial item pool. The obtained factors and 
their correlates were as follows.
Factor 1, accounting for 10.4% of the variance, was labelled 
"conservationist-exploitationist," and was based primarily on acceptance 
or rejection of man-with-nature items (factor scores were derived from 
responses to 13 "with" items, three "over" items, and one "under" item). 
Persons scoring high on Factor 1 were conservationist minded, and 
expressed a willingness to make financial sacrifices and changes in 
life style in order to preserve the environment. --Low scorers, or 
"exploiters," were willing to pay more for consumer goods such as elec­
tricity rather than reduce consumption, were generally unwilling to pay 
taxes -to clean up pollution (even though they tended to see ecological 
solutions in terms of financial expenditures rather than lifestyle 
changes), and were more likely to be frequent churchgoers. This ex- 
ploitationist orientation appears to be quite consistent with an anthro­
pocentric stance. Factor 2 (non man-under-nature vs. man-under-nature 
and hostile toward animals), accounting for 4.5% of the variance (each 
remaining factor accounted for less than 3% of the variance) was a
8
clearcut man-under-nature unipolar dimension (14 "under" items, four 
"over" items, and one "with" item loaded on this factor). Persons 
accepting the man-under-nature orientation tended to be oblivious to 
environmental concerns, and were seen as harboring a general pessimism 
mixed with hostility toward nature. Contrary to expectation, natural 
hazards were found to be more frequently experienced by those rejecting 
the man-under-nature orientation than by those accepting it. It was 
unclear whether rejection of the man-under-nature position was a defense 
mechanism designed to deny the potency of nature in the face of such 
hazards, or whether their more frequent contact with nature (relative to 
persons agreeing with the man-under-nature position) more adequately 
explains the greater hazard proneness of these individuals.
Kameron's factor 3, labelled "non-fear of outdoors vs. fear of 
outdoors" was composed primarily of raan-with and man-under-nature items. 
Persons without fear of the outdoors tended to be male, involved in male 
stereotyped careers or majors, and likely to endorse strong environ­
mental actions. The main difference between this factor and factor 2 
was that fear-of-outdoor types were less hostile to environmental con­
cerns than were man-under-nature types. Factor 4, labelled "anti­
technology vs. pro-technology" consisted almost entirely of raan-over- 
nature items and appeared to indicate "acceptance or non-acceptance of 
some of the modern beliefs that stem from an exploitationist, consumerist, 
homeocentric society" (p. 71). High scorers disagreed with items sug­
gesting a need for science and technology in many areas of life, and 
disagreed that technology can solve our problems. Factor 4 was not 
significantly correlated with factor 1, thereby indicating that
9
rejection of technology does not necessarily imply adoption of a con­
servation ethic. Indeed, whereas factor 1 was significantly correlated 
with involvement in ecological activities, factor 4 was not. Thus, 
anti-technology attitudes are not consistently translated into a con­
servationist lifestyle. Factor 6 involved acceptance vs. rejection of 
"natural" lifestyles (eating health foods; adoption of a "simple" life 
style). Acceptance of such a life style was found to be predictive of 
involvement in outdoor life but, once again, unrelated to involvement 
in ecology related activities. A clear age relationship was noted on 
factor 6, with young persons more likely to endorse the natural life 
style. High scores were interpreted as indicative of a desire to 
"escape to nature." The three remaining factors (#5: anti-gardens vs. 
pro-gardens; #7: pro-gasoline engines vs. anti-gasoline engines; and 
#8: man-under-nature vs. man-over-nature on medical issues) account for 
minimal variance and appear to be more related to specific objects of 
attitudes determined by initial selection of item content than to dis­
tinct underlying value orientations. Finally, it should be noted that 
the 33 items of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale were com­
bined in a random sort with the 93 item scale to produce the 126 item 
measure actually employed in Karaeron's study. Social desirability items 
did not, however, contribute to factor scores, and were insignificantly 
related to the obtained factors, with the exception of minimal correla­
tions for factor #5 (r=-.15) and factor #6 (r=+.14) This finding sug­
gests that there is only minimal consensus regarding the social 
desirability of value orientations regarding the relation of man and 
nature.
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Although the Kameron scale and the Anthropocentrism Scale both 
endeavor to measure man-nature value orientations, they appear to tap 
somewhat different issues. The Kameron scale seeks to measure three 
distinctly different value orientations: man over-, with-, and under­
nature. These orientations refer to values regarding the preferred 
balance.of control or power between man and nature. The Anthropocentism 
Scale, on the other hand, is intended to be a unipolar measure of one's 
level of man-centeredness, and of the man-over-nature attitudes which 
follow from such anthropocentrism. As with other unipolar scales, it 
is easier to say what low scores on the A-scale do not measure, then 
what they do measure. In terms of Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's typology, 
it seems that low scores would involve rejection of man-over-nature 
values, though it is not clear to what extent man-with-nature and/or 
man-under-nature values would be endorsed by low scorers on the Anthro­
pocentrism Scale. Data comparing the Anthropocentrism Scale with 
various factors derived from the Kameron scale would provide validity 
information regarding the meaning of low as well as high scores on the 
Anthropocentrism Scale.
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) and Kameron (1975) thus appear to 
be the only currently available empirical studies which specifically 
investigate values regarding man's proper relationship with nature.
Given the emergence of Environmental Psychology in the last decade, how­
ever, this state of affairs is likely to change soon. Already a number 
of scales have been published measuring environmental dispositions, and 
research investigating the personality correlates of such dispositions 
is beginning to gain momentum. A review of some of the currently
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available measures of environmental attitudes may help clarify the 
nature of the conceptual overlap between such scales and the Anthro­
pocentrism Scale. The Ecology Scale (Maloney et al., 1975) is comprised 
of four subscales, namely, a Verbal Commitment (VC) subscale measuring 
what a person states he is willing to do in reference to environment- 
pollution issues, an Actual Commitment (AC) subscale measuring what a 
person states he actually does in relation to these issues, an Affect 
(A) subscale measuring the level of emotionality related to ecological 
issues, and a Knowledge (K) subscale measuring factual knowledge 
related to ecological issues. The Environmental Response Inventory 
(McKechnie, 1977) is a relatively broad bandwidth device designed both 
to identify and measure the most salient types of environmental dis­
positions in man. The E.R.I. includes six factor-analytically derived 
subscales (Pastoralism, Urbanism, Environmental Adaptation, Stimulus 
Seeking, Environmental Trust, and Antiquarianism), with two additional 
subscales (Need for Privacy, Mechanical Orientation) as well as a 
validity scale (Coramunality) being added later. The Environmental 
Preference Questionnaire (Kaplan, 1977) contains seven subscales, 
respectively measuring preference for natural settings, romantic escape 
from the urban/suburban scene, preference for modern housing and 
industrial development, preference for the suburbs, enjoyment of social­
izing, passive reactions to stress, and preference of cities. Lounsbury 
and Tornatzky (1977) employed cluster analysis in developing a device 
containing three factors/subscales: concern for environmental degrada­
tion, concern for environmental action, and concern for overpopulation. 
Examination of the subscales tapped by these four prominent measures
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indicates that the environmental attitudes sampled by these scales at 
times includes, but is certainly not restricted to views regarding the 
proper relation between mankind and the environment. Such measures tap 
a more global universe of attitudes toward the physical (man-made and 
natural) environment, and on this basis can be distinguished from the 
more narrow pursuits of Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961), Kameron (1975), 
Chandler (Note 1) and the present study.
Further understanding of various facets of an anthropocentric 
ideology can be obtained by reviewing additional data from the 1978 
Chandler study. Results indicated that an anthropocentric individual 
(person scoring high on the Anthropocentrism Scale) is likely to endorse 
human use of the environment for self-serving purposes (average item- 
test correlations of .371, .347, .446, and .444 respectively for items 
#3: "Man should control the environment for his own benefit as much as
possible," #7: "It is wrong for scientists to try to find cures for
human diseases by experimentally producing these diseases in animals," 
#10: "Humans should show more respect for the rights of animals and
plants," and #30: "The primary value of an animal or plant lies in its
ability to serve human needs"). This self-serving control appears to be 
exerted with minimal ethical preconsideration or subsequent regret for 
the adverse environmental consequences of such behavior (as indicated by 
average item-test correlations of .355, .499, .435, and .440 respec­
tively for items #5: "It is wrong to pick flowers for their beauty
value, because in so doing we destroy the life of the flower," #21: 
"Governments should adopt policies which ensure the survival of the 
human species, even if other species become extinct as a result," #24:
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"I occasionally feel that it is morally wrong to eat meat," and #28: 
"Sometimes my conscience prevents me from killing bothersome flies and 
insects"). The anthropocentric individual's belief in human superiority 
tends to be at least partially based on the use of self-enhancing 
criteria of superiority, as indicated by an average item-test correla­
tion of .393 for item #17: "Degree of intelligence ought to be the main
measure for determining the superiority of one species over another."
This conclusion assumes the premise that research participants consid­
ered humans to be the most intelligent form of life. Results also 
indicated that belief in human superiority on this planet tends to be 
supplemented by the conviction that advanced extra-terrestial life is 
either nonexistent or inferior to man, as indicated by average item- 
test correlations of .348, .402, and .259 respectively for items #2: "It
is quite possible that highly advanced civilizations exist in other parts 
of the universe," #9: "If we eventually discover life in other parts of
the universe, such life will probably be found to be inferior to human 
life," and #15: "It is likely that 'flying saucers' are presently
visiting earth."' While the various values, attitudes, beliefs, and ' 
behavioral dispositions discussed above are not necessarily coexistent, 
the generally moderate item-test correlations do indicate a considerable 
degree of consistency. The extent of this logical and statistical con­
sistency seems sufficient to defend the use of the construct "anthro­
pocentrism" to encompass this multifaceted attitudinal constellation.
Before turning to additional requirements for construct validation, 
attention is now briefly focused on some of the historical developments 
which have reflected, fostered, or undercut anthropocentrism. The
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intent here is merely to highlight certain major historical markers, not 
to minutely trace the history of anthropocentrism. It should be empha­
sized, however, that such markers occur only upon a background of 
subtle historical change in man's behavior and ideas regarding the 
natural world. A full treatment of such changes can be found in 
Glacken (1967), who intricately examined the historical course of the 
relationship of human culture to the natural environment by focusing 
on the development of three ideas: (a) the theological assumption that
the planet is purposefully designed and ordered (whether for man alone, 
as the highest being of creation, or for the hierarchy of life with man 
at the apex), (b) the idea of environmental influences upon man, and (c) 
the idea of man as a geographic agent, working as a partner of God to 
improve upon and cultivate an earth created for himself. In regard to 
the latter notion, Glacken examined the development of the "steward­
ship" view of man's relation to nature in classical Greek and Judeo- 
Christian thought, and concluded,
The theme that man, sinful though he be, occupies a position on 
earth comparable to that of God in the universe, as a personal 
possession, a realm of stewardship, has been one of the key 
ideas in the religious and philosophical thought of Western 
civilization regarding man's place in nature (Glacken, 1967, 
p. 155).
The notion of stewardship, of man supervising, completing, and even 
improving upon the creation of God, helped provide a rationale for those 
who would exploit nature for self-serving ends. The anthropocentric 
aspects of this notion of stewardship seemed to reach full blossom in 
the emergence of Christianity. Indeed, in the history of philosophy, an 
anthropocentric bias is perhaps most clearly evident in the dogma of 
Western Christianity, which asserts man's transcendence of and rightful
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mastery over nature. Although man is meant to serve God; human impor­
tance relative to the rest of creation is distinctly reflected in man's 
monopoly of everlasting life, as well as in the story of creation 
inherited from Judaism. As White (1969, p. 347) noted,
Man named all the animals, thus establishing his dominance over 
them. God planned all of this explicitly for man's benefit and 
rule: no item in the physical creation had any purpose save to 
serve man's purposes. And, although man's body is made of clay, 
he is not simply a part of nature; he is made in God's image.
Especially in its Western form, Christianity is the most 
anthropocentric religion the world has ever seen. . . . Man 
shares in great measure, God's transcendence of nature.
Christianity, in absolute contrast to ancient paganism and 
Asia's religions (except, perhaps, Zoroastrianism), not only 
established a dualism of man and nature but also insisted that 
it is God's will that man exploit nature for his proper ends.
White added that the elimination, by Christianity, of paganism effec­
tively eradicated the spirits in objects which had protected nature, 
thus providing man with a monopoly on spirit in the natural world, and 
minimizing old inhibitions to the exploitation of nature.
Despite the relative decline of its theocentric underpinnings, 
the anthropocentrism of Western Christianity appears to have survived 
and flourished, and according to White, has contributed substantially 
to our present ecological crisis. It is no minor coincidence that modern 
science and technology, which have afforded man quantum leaps in his 
ability to control the environment, and the anthropocentric religious 
view which sanctions such control, are both primarily Occidental in 
origin and development. Note should be taken, however, of a major ex­
ception to the rule of Christian anthropocentrism, the St. Francis 
tradition. As White notes, St. Francis laid great emphasis on the 
virtue of humility, for man as a species as well as an individual, and
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exemplified a radically equalitarian stance regarding man and other 
creatures. In the context of man's relation with nature, however, St. 
Francis is clearly an exception within Western Christianity, which must 
be viewed as one of the major contributors in the historical growth of 
anthropocentrism.
Turning from theology to astronomy, a rather striking illustration 
of anthropocentrism is to be found in the geocentric model of the 
universe. The fact that the notion of the entire universe revolving 
around a stationary earth was not fully discredited until the introduc­
tion of Kepler's theories in the early 17th century seems attributable 
to two main factors. The first determinant appears to be the prolonged 
acceptance of the Pythagorian assumption that celestial bodies move in 
uniform circular motions. As Kopal (1970, p. 33) has pointed out, in 
the absence of Kepler's theory of elliptical planetary orbits, " . . .  
the heliocentric system--although geometrically simpler--could not 
represent the observed motions of celestial bodies really any better 
than the earlier geocentric one . . . "  If the geocentric and heliocen­
tric models were equally poor in their ability to account for the 
mechanics of celestial movement, one might reasonably ask why the geo­
centric position so fully predominated pre-Copernican thought. Why did 
the heliocentric theory of Aristarchos in the 3rd century B.C. receive 
so little acceptance, and why did the Copernican reintroduction of 
heliocentrism in the 16th century precipitate such a storm of protest? 
First of all, geocentrism is consistent with the outward appearances of 
the sun and other stars revolving about a seemingly motionless earth. 
However, the hesitancy to question this common sense proposition, given
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the availability of the equally plausible heliocentric cosmology, seems 
attributable to the anthropocentrism which was evident as an underlying 
current in the Stoic philosophy of Aristarchos' era as well as in the 
Christian philosophy which dominated the 16th century.
Thus, the geocentric conception of the universe seems to have 
been fueled by, and in turn reinforced an anthropocentric world view.
This cosmological support of anthropocentrism has largely crumbled under 
the impact of Keplerian evidence confirming the heliocentric model as 
well as more recent advances in the field of astronomy. Our sun is now 
believed to be just one of some hundred billion stars in the Milky Way 
system, which is but one of some billion visible galaxies in an expanding 
universe of yet undetermined dimensions. The implications of such 
findings for our view of man's significance are potentially quite 
humbling. Nevertheless, the anthropocentric individual can still mar­
shall cosmological support for his belief system by pointing to the 
commonly accepted notion that our earth is the only harbor of life in 
the universe. As indicated by results of the Chandler study dis­
cussed above, anthropocentric individuals do tend to dismiss the possi­
bility of extraterrestial life, particularly the likelihood of advanced 
life forms. Any discovery of such life would likely surpass even 
Darwin's theory of evolution in its impact upon the collective human 
self-image.
The introduction of Darwinian evolutionary theory dealt perhaps 
the major blow thus far to the rational foundation of anthropocentrism.
By positing an evolutionary link between man and "lower" forms of life, 
Darwin effectively bridged the chasm of dissimilarity which had
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previously separated man from other life forms. Man's uniqueness was 
now susceptible to a more quantitative interpretation, where only quali­
tative distinctions between man and animal had received previous popular 
accreditation. As LaBarre (1954) has observed, these implications of 
evolutionary theory were not readily assimilated into the Western view 
of man.
It is interesting that traditional Christian culture should have 
been so much exercized to discover differences between man and 
animals. These differences are by no means so evident to (or 
sought for by) a majority of peoples of non-European origin.
Most non-Europeans in their philosophy and folklore have easily 
assumed a kinship of man with other animals--which Darwinian 
evolution has been able to demonstrate to Europeans only against 
their strongest emotional and institutional resistances 
(LaBarre, 1954, pp. 293-294).
The recognition of this relatedness between man and animal has still not
been fully integrated into our view of ourselves, as indicated by the
enduring strength of Western dualism between man and nature. Indeed,
Sheppard (1969) maintained that the ultimate task of the human mind will
be "affirmation of its own organic existence," and called for
. . . exploration and openness across an inner boundary— an ego 
boundary--and appreciative understanding of the animal in our 
selves which our heritage of Platonism, Christian morbidity, 
duality, and mechanism have long held repellent and degrading.
The older counter currents— relics of pagan myth, the universal 
application of Christian compassion, philosophical naturalism, 
nature romanticism and pantheism— have been swept away, leaving 
only odd bits of wreckage (p. 3).
Despite ongoing resistance, however, the cumulative impact of Darwinian
evolutionary theory has been to dramatically accentuate similarities
between man and other elements of nature, and to seriously question the
appropriateness of man's heretofore grandiosity.
By the time Darwin introduced his evolutionary theory, another
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development with massive implications had reached full force. By the 
late 18th and early 19th centuries the Baconian creed, maintaining that 
scientific knowledge should be applied to bring about technological 
power over nature, had been put into effect on a widespread scale. Tech­
nological applications of science had progressed to the point where 
anthropocentric attitudes could be translated into industrial harnessing 
of nature as a basic policy of western civilization. The exponential 
growth of man's control over the environment since the late 18th century 
has been accompanied by increasingly impactful consequences. Whereas 
positive consequences have previously been emphasized, increasing aware­
ness of potentially self-destructive consequences has led, within this 
century, to the growth of ecological consciousness as a counterforce to 
the more traditional anthropocentric ideology.
This is "not to say that nonanthropocentric ecological attitudes
are a distinctly 20th century phenomenon. George Marsh's publication
of Man and Nature in 1867, presenting an exhaustive technical account of
how man, to his own detriment, has disrupted the balance of nature has
been termed the fountainhead of the'conservation movement. Moreover as
Sheppard <1969) pointed out, such ecological attitudes have
. . . been embodied in widely scattered economically different 
cultures. It is manifest, for example, among pre-Classical 
Greeks, in Navajo religion and social orientation, in Romantic 
poetry of the 18th and 19th centuries, in Chinese landscape 
painting of the 11th century, in current Whiteheadian philosophy, 
in Zen Buddhism, in the world view of the cult of the Cretan 
Great Mother, in the ceremonials of Bushman hunters, and in the 
Christian metaphysics of light. What is common among all of 
them is a deep sense of engagement with the landscape, with 
profound connections to surroundings and to natural processes 
central to life (p. 5).
Thus the current resurgence of ecological thinking can be viewed as a
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reawakening of views evident in past centuries, particularly in the 
Eastern hemisphere, as well as a reaction to the fallout of the indus­
trial age. Other developments in recent centuries have contributed to 
the relative erosion of anthropocentric attitudes. Post-Darwinian 
application of systems theory to environmental analyses (e.g., the con­
cept of "ecosystem") has supported notions regarding the interrelated­
ness of elements of nature at the expense of anthropocentric dualism.
The relative decline of religion in recent centuries has undercut the 
theocentric underpinnings of anthropocentrism, thereby further eroding 
support for this position. This is certainly not to say that an anthro­
pocentric approach to man's position and role in nature is in its death 
throes. There appear to be a number of sources of motivational support 
for anthropocentrism (to be discussed herein) which are not likely to 
disappear, and anthropocentrism appears to be a very marketable 
commodity within the business world. Certainly the strongest contribu­
tor to man's continuing self-serving control of nature is the tremendous 
reinforcing value of past successes at such control. Although recent 
awareness of negative consequences of man's control has led to a re­
examination of this control, behavioral respect for the environment in 
the future seems likely to be anthropocentric in motivation. That is, 
respect for the environment is likely to flow not from some new found 
respect for the inherent value of nature, but rather from the extent to 
which man perceives his own fate to be anchored in the environmental 
status quo (i.e., the extent to which environmentalists can successfully 
appeal to anthropocentric values). While anthropocentrism is likely to 
continue in coming centuries, it nonetheless does appear that the
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prevailing consensus view of man's place in nature involves consider­
ably more humility than the view which dominated Western thought a half- 
millenium ago.
Attention is now returned to an examination of the requirements 
for the accumulation of construct validation of "anthropocentrism," and 
for validation of an operational measure of this trait: the Anthro-
pocentism Scale. Ideally, the validation of a given construct, and 
the validation of a method for measuring the construct, can to some 
extent be dealt with as separate issues, both conceptually and empiri­
cally. In discussing their multitrait-multimethod matrix, Campbell and 
Fiske (1959) specified the circumstances in which these two validation 
issues can be disentangled. By using the same type of method to measure 
more than one trait, and by measuring each trait by different methods, 
the relative contributions of trait and method variance can be separately 
evaluated. Because there is only one available measure of anthropocen­
trism, however, the multimethod approach of Campbell and Fiske could not 
be brought to bear on the validation issues at hand. Thus, to a greater 
extent than might otherwise have been desired, this study investigated 
the validity of a construet-operation unit. Given the absence of 
alternate methods of measurement of anthropocentrism, any defects in the 
Anthropocentrism Scale would have a magnified negative effect on attempts 
to secure validity for the construct "anthropocentrism." Accordingly it 
is important to review the development and standardization of the 
Anthropocentrism Scale to determine the extent to which it is a valid 
measure unconfounded by response sets and other method specific variance.
First of all, the test-retest reliability (with a two-week
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interval between administrations) of an earlier form of the Anthro­
pocentrism Scale, from which only two items were dropped in the final 
form, was .913. Although this figure is probably a slight overestimate 
of the reliability of the final form (given the elimination of two 
items), it is clearly within acceptable limits. Regarding method 
specific'variance due to response sets, Anthropocentrism Scale scores 
were found to be minimally correlated with a measure of test taking 
defensiveness, the K-scale of the M.M.P.I. (r » +.149, p (.05). Inter­
estingly, Kameron (1975) found that his scale tapping man-over-, under-, 
and with-nature orientations was only minimally influenced by social 
desirability response set, as measured by the Social Desirability Scale 
(Crowne and Marlowe, 1964). Although the correlations found in the 
Chandler (Note 1) and Kameron (1975) studies were minimal in size, their 
significance suggested that it may be helpful to explore further the 
operation of social desirability response set in Anthropocentrism 
Scale responses, perhaps by utilizing the Crowne-Marlowe scale. This 
scale is a more direct method of tapping social desirability than the 
M.M.P.I. K-Scale, and has the added benefit of having been employed in 
the Kameron study. Other response sets to be controlled include 
acquiescence and negative response biases. These response sets were 
largely controlled for by wording initial Anthropocentrism Scale items 
in both positive and negative directions, in roughly equal proportions. 
Seventeen of the thirty final form items are negatively phrased, thereby 
minimizing, though not completely eliminating confounding from such 
response sets.
Attention is now focused on the initial selection of items, and
the extent to which they adequately represent the construct they are 
intended to measure. Two related questions are raised in regard to this 
item analysis. First, to what extent are the items representative o£ 
the entire universe of anthropocentric values, attitudes, behaviors, and 
beliefs? Second, should a measure of this universe rely primarily upon 
abstract general items which tap wide ranging values affecting a variety 
of specific attitudes, or should specific concrete behavioral and atti- 
tudinal examples of anthropocentrism be the primary target of study, 
even though these may reflect substantial variance from sources other 
than anthropocentric values? Turning first to the question of content 
validity, or representativeness of items in sampling the universe of 
manifestations of anthropocentrism, it is clear that this universe it­
self is not yet clearly defined. The content validity of "anthropo­
centrism" is only minimally established at this time, leaving identi­
fication of the manifestations of anthropocentrism to future studies.
An attempt was made in the 1978 Chandler study to sample a wide 
variety of items, but the resulting 35 items initially generated were 
probably not numerous or heterogeneous enough to sample adequately the 
unknown universe of manifestations of anthropocentrism.
The unknown dimensions of this universe raise the second question: 
to what extent should error in sampling this unknown universe be reduced 
by employing abstract items which do not refer to highly specific con­
tent areas. On one hand, a highly abstract, indirect test could be 
used, based on items which state abstract generalizations or values 
likely to affect a variety of more specific concrete attitudes. Examples 
of such items are item #6: "Man is the most important species on earth,"
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and #30: "The primary value of an animal or plant lies in its ability
to serve human needs." On the other hand, a more direct, concrete, 
heterogeneous test could be developed tapping a wide variety of specific 
attitudes, each of which supposedly reflects the core anthropocentric 
value explicitly stated in the above items. Such a direct test has the 
advantage of greater breadth, and examines attitudinal claims about 
real world behavior which is subject to direct observation. Thus, for 
instance, the behavioral validity (consistency between professed atti­
tude and actual behavior) of item #5 ("It is wrong to pick flowers for 
their beauty value because in so doing we destroy the life of the 
flower") is easier to determine than the behavioral validity of more 
abstract items such as #6 and #30 discussed above. However, the use 
of such specific items also introduces a good deal of content- 
specific variance. That is, response to an item regarding picking of 
flowers taps a variety of issues relevant to one's attitude toward 
flowers, but irrelevant to one's values regarding the relation of man 
and nature. Such content-specific variance is probably harmless if 
the content itself is representatively sampled from the universe of con­
tent, that is, if the test has content validity. However, since the 
empirical investigation of anthropocentrism is just beginning, this 
universe is largely unknown, and content validity cannot be clearly es­
tablished. Thus, it is possible that excessive content-specific 
variance has been built into the Anthropocentrism Scale.
Factor analysis is one tool which could shed some light on the 
extent to which.construct vs. content-specific variance is measured by 
the Anthropocentrism Scale. Would anthropocentrism show up as a broad
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major factor (with high loadings on abstract value based items), and/or 
would a variety of content specific factors (e.g., an "attitudes toward 
extraterrestial life" factor) appear? One purpose of this study was 
to conduct a factor analysis to determine whether excessive content 
specific variance has been built into the Anthropocentrism Scale. It 
may be that a "pure^ anthropocentrism" factor, loading highly on 
abstract value items such as #6 and #30, can be derived. Such a factor 
would complement the more content-specific, heterogeneously based total 
score on the Anthropocentrism Scale. In any event, such a factorial 
study would help assess the extent of content specific variance on the 
Anthropocentrism Scale, and thereby add to the available data regarding 
the adequacy of this scale as a measure of the construct "anthropo­
centrism."
Such a factor analysis would also provide data on the construct 
validity of anthropocentrism, an issue which will now be examined in 
detail. A factor analytic study would contribute an analysis of data 
relevant to construct validity by determining whether a broad, unitary 
"anthropocentrism" factor does indeed account for a major portion of 
the variance on the Anthropocentrism Scale. An alternate possibility 
is that a number of factors of less breadth (broader than factors 
loading only on specific content items, but less broad than a unitary 
all-encompassing factor) would appear. Such factors might appear 
either in the absence of, or in addition to, an anthropocentrism factor 
(a factor on which abstract value laden items such as #6, #29, and #30 
would be required to load highly). Regardless of outcome, such an 
analysis would provide helpful information regarding the breadth and
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facets of the construct anthropocentrism. Furthermore, it would be 
possible to relate these factors (as well as total score on the Anthro­
pocentrism Scale) to other variables measured in the course of this 
study, thereby further clarifying the nature of the construct "anthro­
pocentrism" and any constituent factors.
What other methods might be employed to investigate the nature 
of the construct anthropocentrism? Cronbach and Meehl (1955) have sug­
gested the development of a "noraological net," that is, a network of 
testable hypotheses relating the construct at hand to other constructs 
and observables. Convergent validity is examined by determining whether 
significant correlations do indeed emerge between the construct and 
other variables with which it is supposed to be related, while dis­
criminant validity is established by proving that supposedly irrelevant 
factors do not contribute significantly to the construct in question 
(Campbell and Fiske, 1959). The remainder of this section will be 
devoted to the development of a nomological net for the construct 
"anthropocentrism." As Cronbach and Meehl (1955) note, such a network 
is limited in scope during the early investigation of a construct, but 
"As research proceeds, the construct sends out roots in many directions, 
which attach it to more and more facts or other constructs" (p. 291).
The network developed in the following pages is intended to provide the 
initial spurt in the growth of this root system.
In developing such a network, it is important that the construct 
"anthropocentrism" be related both to other hypothetical constructs and 
to overt behaviors. In regard to behavioral correlates, it should be 
noted that anthropocentrism is a hypothetical construct created to
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describe the consistency between a variety of responses, none of which, 
in itself, serves as a direct measure of the construct. Given the 
absence of such direct criterion measures, the need to assess construct 
validity is imperative (APA, 1966). Avenues for the collection of 
criterion-related validity are also apparent, however. Even though no 
particular overt behavior stands alone as a satisfactory behavioral 
measure of anthropocentrism, a variety of behaviors have been postu­
lated as manifestations of an anthropocentric value. Given the sub­
stantial research indicating the tenuousness of relationships between 
verbally expressed attitudes and overt behavior (Liska, 1975), the need 
to relate verbally expressed anthropocentrism to these behavioral mani­
festations is apparent. Accordingly, one focus of this research study 
has been to develop a list of behaviors which might be expected on the 
part of highly anthropocentric or highly nonanthropocentric individuals. 
By asking research participants whether they do indeed display such 
behaviors, the degree of concordance between anthropocentric attitudes 
and various behaviors hypothesized to depend upon such attitudes can be 
determined. Such data would indicate the extent to which verbally 
expressed anthropocentric attitudes are translated into behavior. This 
approach assumes, of course, that respondents are accurate in describing 
their own behaviors. Given this assumption, the resulting data would 
help address the question of the "behavioral validity" of the Anthro­
pocentrism Scale, and of the construct "anthropocentrism."
A number of hypotheses can be developed regarding the relation of 
anthropocentrism to various hypothetical constructs as well. The con­
structs which were empirically explored in relation to anthropocentrism
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in this study included Kameron's (1975) man-over-, under-, or with- 
nature, as well as locus of control, egocentrism/narcissism, 
ethnocentrism, and attitudes regarding human nature. Each of these 
is examined in detail below. Looking first at Kameron's research, 
four factors are relevant to the construct validity of anthropocentrism. 
To begin with, anthropocentrism should correlate positively with Factor 
1 "conservationist-e x p l o i t a t i o n i s t It seems likely that highly 
anthropocentric persons would reject the man-with-nature items that 
comprise this factor, and thereby adopt an exploitationist stance, 
while persons scoring low in anthropocentrism seem likely to accept 
man-with-nature items. A significant positive correlation would also 
be expected between anthropocentrism and Factor 4, "anti-technology- 
pro-technology.11 It seems quite likely that highly anthropocentric 
individuals would endorse technological progress, while relatively non- 
anthropocentric individuals would be more likely to reject the man-over- 
nature items which predominately contribute to this factor. The 
potential relations between anthropocentrism and Kameron's factors 2 
and 3 are less predictable, but would be helpful in illuminating the
1-Given the method of obtaining factor scores by multiplying item 
score times factor loading for that item, the use of factor loadings 
provided by Kameron results in high factor scores for persons adopting 
the position described in the latter half of each bipolar factor label 
(e.g., conservationist vs. exploitationist; high scores on this first 
factor are exploiters). Kameron apparently reflects (multiplies by 
-1) his factor scores, since the labels he assigns to high and low 
scorers (1975, p. 93) are directly opposite to the labels which would be 
assigned if the factor scores were not reflected. In deriving Kameron 
factor scores in the study at hand, factor scores were not reflected; 
thus, low scorers can be identified by the first term in the label, and 
high scorers can be identified by the underlined second term of the 
factor label.
29
meaning of low scores on the Anthropocentrism Scale. Factor 2 (non man- 
under-nature vs. man-under-nature and hostile toward animals^ involves 
rejection vs. acceptance of man-under-nature items, whereas Factor 3 
(non fear of outdoors vs. fear of outdoors^ involves agreement with man- 
with-nature items versus agreement with man-under-nature items. It 
would thus be instructive to note whether nonanthropocentric persons 
tend primarily to adopt a man-with-nature position (low scores on 
factors 1 and 3), a man-under-nature position (high scores on factor 2 
and 3), or both (low scores on factor 1, high scores on factor 2, mixed 
scores on factor 3).
In discussing the man-nature value orientations, Kameron noted 
that selection of a particular orientation seems dependent mainly on 
one's perception of locus of control vis-a-vis nature. Thus, man- 
under-nature types appear to adopt a rather fatalistic external locus 
of control positing the uncontrollable nature of the environment. Man- 
over-nature types appear to believe that nature can and should be con­
trolled, thereby endorsing an internal locus of control in man's 
dealings with nature. For man-with-nature types, a more reciprocal 
notion of the mutual influence of man and nature appears to be held. 
Although Kameron did not empirically measure internal-external locus of 
control, it might be expected that both a man-over-nature orientation 
and an anthropocentric stance would be associated with an internal locus 
of control. An internal locus of control involves belief that events 
and reinforcements are contingent upon one's behavior and characteris­
tic rather than on chance or external factors (Rotter, 1966). As Joe 
(1971) noted in his review of research on the internal-external control
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construct, "Although there Is some negative evidence, It appears safe 
to conclude that Internals, In contrast to externals, would show a 
greater tendency to seek Information and adopt behavior patterns which 
facilitate personal control over their environments." Although items 
on Rotter's scale refer primarily to general personal control over one's 
fate, as well as social and political control, it seems likely that 
beliefs regarding the possibility and advisability of control over the 
natural environment would be associated with perception of locus of 
control in these other domains. Thus, anthropocentric individuals would 
be expected to maintain an internal locus of control. Persons adopting 
a nonanthropocentric stance seem more likely to perceive man-nature 
relations as a matter of reciprocal influence and control (internal 
and external factors interact in determining one's fate; man should 
work with nature in determining environmental consequences), or from an 
external locus of control (external factors determine one's fate; 
nature determines man's fate). It thus seems likely that a significant 
negative correlation would be found between internal-external locus of 
control (low scores indicating an internal locus) and anthropocentrism.
It also seems likely that man-nature value orientations would be ordered, 
in terms of increasing external locus of control, in the following 
manner: man-over-nature, man-with-nature, man-under nature.
Yet another construct which can be theoretically related to 
anthropocentrism is "egocentrism." If egocentrism is defined in terms 
of self-absorption (preoccupation with oneself, coupled with relative 
inattention to the external environment), selfishness (emphasis on the 
satisfaction of one's own needs at the expense of other's needs), and
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self-aggrandizement (grandiose overevaluation of self), the parallels 
between this concept and anthropocentrism are apparent. Anthropocen­
trism involves a preoccupation with one's own species coupled with rela­
tive inattention to other species; emphasis on the satisfaction of man's 
needs at the expense of the needs of other species; and a view of man 
as an exalted preeminent being relative.to other species. Thus, to the 
extent that attitudes toward oneself are reflected in corresponding 
attitudes toward one's ego-extensions and ingroups (the groups which an 
individual belongs to and identifies with, whether they be ethnic, 
religious, national, familial, or in the case of anthropocentrism, 
one's species), persons who adopt a relatively egocentric stance might 
also be expected to be anthropocentric in outlook. That is, individuals 
who take a self-centered approach to interpersonal relations might be 
expected to extend their self-centered outlook to ingroup— outgroup 
relations, and thereby take a man-centered approach to interspecies 
relations. On these grounds, a positive correlation between the con­
structs anthropocentrism and egocentrism (as defined herein) might be 
expected.
Difficulties arise, however,when attempting to explore the rela­
tion of these two constructs empirically. The primary empirical usage of 
the construct "egocentrism" has been within the Piagetian cognitive- 
developmental framework. Within this framework, egocentrism has been 
defined rather narrowly, emphasizing cognitive skills. For example,
Looft (1972, p. 74) notes that within cognitive developmental psy­
chology, egocentrism "does not pertain to selfishness or an overly keen 
regard of oneself, or even to the frequent use of 'I' and 'me.' The
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essential meaning of egocentrism is an embeddedness in one's own point 
of view." Looft*s definition explicitly excluded two facets of the 
concept of egocentrism employed herein: selfishness and self-
aggrandizement. The core meaning of his definition, "embeddedness in 
one's own point of view," is related but not identical to the third 
facet: self-preoccupation. Similarly, Ford (1979, pp. 1170-1171)
concluded that the varying current definitions of egocentrism " . . .  
share a common core of meaning: Each refers to an individual's 
failure to perceive a situation or an event in more than one way.
This one way of perceiving is the one that is easiest for the indi­
vidual, that is, the one that requires no conceptual elaboration 
beyond what is directly perceived." The cognitive emphasis of this 
definition, and of the cognitive-developmental measures of egocentrism 
based on such definitions, is apparent. This emphasis on cognitive 
factors probably contributes to the tendency of egocentrism "perspec­
tive taking" tasks to be confounded with intelligence, spatial and 
perceptual skills, and other cognitive factors (Ford, 1979). Further­
more, because the cognitive deficits which theoretically underlie 
egocentrism are assumed to disappear with the appearance of formal 
operations in adolescence, the concept of egocentrism is not considered 
relevant to adulthood (Looft, 1972). Consequently, the cognitive- 
developmental measures of egocentrism are largely restricted to mea­
surement of childhood egocentrism.
Because of the somewhat narrow, cognitively based, age-restricted 
nature of the cognitive-developmental concept of egocentrism, measures 
of egocentrism based on this concept are at best tangential to the
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concerns of this study. A related construct which is perhaps more 
relevant to the concept of egocentrism used herein is the psychoanaly­
tic concept of "narcissism." Although this term has various meanings 
within psychoanalytic theory, the glossary of the American Psycho­
analytical Association defines narcissism as "A concentration of 
psychological interest upon the self" (Moore and Fine, 1967, p. 57).
Similarily, Kernberg (1976, p. 115) reserves the term narcissism to
represent " . . .  the normal and pathological vicissitudes of the
libidinal investment of the self," and describes the conditions leading
to the development of pathological narcissism. The pathological 
variant of narcissism involves heightened grandiosity and yearning for 
lost omnipotence as a central feature— the "grandiose self" in Kohut's 
(1971) terms. The reader is referred to Grunberger (1979) for an 
in-depth review of narcissism as an analytic concept. The main point 
to be made here is that this concept of narcissism does have sig­
nificant overlap with the concept of egocentrism used herein. Notions 
of self-preoccupation and self-aggrandizement are apparent in the 
features of narcissism described above, and the notion of selfish con­
centration on one's own needs is inherent in the term "narcissistic 
sense of entitlement."
Although these aspects of narcissism serve to define the meaning 
of the term "egocentrism" used herein, analytic literature has been 
less helpful when it comes to measurement. Analytic identification of 
narcissism has usually been based upon analysts' judgements, a method 
well beyond the scope of the research methodology considered herein. 
However, a technique developed by Exner (1973), grounded in the concepts
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of narcissism and egocentrism, appears to be relevant to a portion of 
the concept of egocentrism relied upon herein. Termed the Self Focus 
Sentence Completion, this measure results in an "egocentric balance" 
score involving the difference between the number of self-focused vs. 
external-world focused completions of sentence stems. Available 
validity data reported by Exner support this technique as a measure of 
concern with oneself versus concern with the external world. Thus, 
it does appear possible to measure the relation between anthropocen­
trism and egocentrism, given a definition of egocentrism as "pre­
occupation with oneself and one's own needs."
Of the three facets of egocentrism emphasized above, only self- 
aggrandizement is excluded from this measurement approach. The relation 
between such self-aggrandizement and anthropocentrism has already been 
empirically explored (Chandler, Note 1) . That study hypothesized that 
defensively elevated self-esteem (as indicated by high conscious self­
esteem coupled with high defensiveness) would be associated with a 
highly anthropocentric outlook, with realistically high self-esteem and 
inadequately defended low self-esteem being associated with moderate 
and low anthropocentrism, respectively. However, the predicted differ­
ences in anthropocentrism did not reach significance in the small sample 
evaluated, and correlations between anthropocentrism and both self­
esteem (r ** +.065, not significant) and defensiveness (r = +.149,
2, (.05) were minimal. While further exploration of the relation between 
defensiveness and anthropocentrism may prove fruitful, the Chandler 
study indicated that self-aggrandizement, as reflected in defensively 
elevated conscious self-esteem, is unrelated to the exaltation of one's
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species inherent in anthropocentrism. By employing Exner's scale as an 
indicator of "preoccupation with oneself and one's own needs," it would 
be possible to investigate the relation of anthropocentrism to the 
other facets of egocentrism as defined herein— self-preoccupation/ 
selfishness. It is hypothesized that concern with oneself would be 
associated with an anthropocentric outlook, whereas concern with the 
external world would be associated with a nonanthropocentric stance.
This issue of the relatedness of egocentrism and anthropocen­
trism gives rise to the question of whether all types of "centric" 
thinking tend to be associated. One heavily researched area of 
"centric" attitudes involves the construct "ethnocentrism," first 
defined by Sumner (1907, p. 13) as a "view of things in which one's 
own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and 
rated with reference to it." More recently, LeVine and Campbell (1972, 
p. 1) have noted,
Ethnocentrism has become a familiar word most generally 
understood, in parallel with 'egocentrism,' as an attitude or 
outlook in which values derived from one's own cultural back­
ground are applied to other cultural contexts where different 
values are operative. In the most naive form of ethnocen­
trism . . .  a person unreflexively takes his own culture's 
values as objective reality and automatically uses them as 
the context within which he judges less familiar objects and 
events. As in Piaget's stage of egocentric thought, it does 
not occur to such a person that there is more than one point 
of view. At a more complex level is the ethnocentric atti­
tude or outlook that takes account of multiple points of 
view but regards those of other cultures as incorrect, 
inferior, or immoral.
If the word "species" were substituted for the word "cultures" in this
definition, the parallels between ethnocentrism and anthropocentrism
become clear. Both involve the use of a set of narrow self-serving
values in judging various groups, resulting in a highly positive valuing
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of one's own group (culture or species) coupled with a prejudiced de­
valuation of outsiders (other cultures and species). On this basis, a 
positive correlation between anthropocentrism and ethnocentrism might 
be expected.
However, Adorno et al. (1950) have addressed this issue and have 
come to an opposite conclusion, maintaining that ethnocentrism and an 
identification with mankind as a whole are incompatible. A brief 
review of the concepts used by Adorno et al. in describing ethnocen­
trism will help illuminate the basis for their reasoning on this issue. 
Employing the concepts "ingroup" and "outgroup" originally provided by 
Sumner (1906), Adorno et al. view ethnocentrism as an ideological 
system pertaining to groups and group relations. They summarize (p. 
148),
A primary characteristic of ethnocentric ideology is the 
generality of outgroup rejection. It is as if the ethnocen­
tric individual feels threatened by most of the groups to 
which he does not have a sense of belonging; if he cannot 
identify, he must oppose; if a group is not 'acceptable,1 it 
is 'alien.' The ingroup-outgroup distinction thus becomes 
the basis for most of his social thinking and people are 
categorized primarily according to the groups to which they 
belong.
The possible association between ethnocentrism and anthropocentrism 
revolves about the issue of whether humanity can be conceptualized as 
an ingroup in the mind of the ethnocentric individual. At one juncture 
in their analysis, Adorno et al. explicitly rejected this possibility: 
"The ethnocentric 'need for an outgroup' prevents that identification 
with humanity as a whole which is found in anti-ethnocentrism" (p. 148). 
Seemingly implicit in this statement, however, is the assumption that 
"humanity" is the most inclusive of all groups, and thus cannot be
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contrasted with a suitable outgroup. If one transcends the intraspecies 
level of analysis of the Adorno et al. study, it becomes clear that 
other species can be distinguished from the human species on an ingroup/ 
outgroup basis. Given this expanded notion of ingroup constituency, it 
appears that the hypothesis of a positive correlation between ethnocen­
trism and anthropocentrism is actually an extension rather than a 
negation of the findings reported by Adorno et al. In this regard, the 
following statement is particularly relevant.
Another general characteristic of ethnocentric ideology is the 
shifting of the outgroup among various levels of social organiza­
tion. Once the social context for discussion has been set, 
enthnocentrists are likely to find an outgroup-ingroup distinc­
tion (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 147).
If the context of discussion centers upon the importance and rights of
humans versus those of members of other species, it seems likely that
the enthnocentrist would readily espouse an identification with humanityI
On this basis, a positive correlation between anthropocentrism and
ethnocentrism is hypothesized.
Finally, it is necessary to distinguish attitudes regarding man's 
stature and role in nature from other attitudes toward humanity. 
Wrightsman (1964) constructed a Philosophies of Human Nature (PHN)
Scale involving six subscales. Four of these subscales contribute to a 
summary score labelled Positive vs. Negative, indicating one's general 
evaluative orientation toward human nature. Unlike the Anthropocentrism 
Scale, the PHN Scale was not specifically designed to tap conceptions 
of man's stature and role vis-a-vis the rest of nature. It seems quite 
possible that some individuals who view human nature in a generally 
negative light (e.g., as manifested in PHN Scale responses), would, if
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provided with a suitable outgroup (i.e., the nonhuman environment), 
strongly identify with and favorably evaluate humanity. Likewise, a 
positive view of human nature does not necessarily require anthropo­
centrism as a logical derivative; it may alternatively be but one facet 
of an omnicentric view, in which the entire environment is positively 
valued. It is important to note that the Anthropocentrism Scale 
does not attempt to assess evaluative attitudes toward mankind per 
se. Rather, the scale seeks to assess the relative value assigned to 
humanity in relation to the value assigned to the nonhuman natural 
environment. Given this distinction, the relationship between the 
Anthropocentrism Scale and Wrightsman's PHN Scale requires empirical 
investigation to determine if they do indeed measure separate con­
structs. Requirements of discriminant validity would call for a small 
correlation (if significant at all) between these two variables, 
regardless of the direction of this correlation.
In summary, a nomological net has been constructed for anthropo­
centrism involving hypotheses regarding the relations between this con­
struct and various other constructs and behavioral referents. Empirical 
testing of these hypotheses is relevant to the construct validity of 
anthropocentrism, and the validity of the Anthropocentrism Scale as a 
measure of this construct. For those constructs which would be ex­
pected to converge with anthropocentrism, significant low to moderate 
correlations with anthropocentrism would be expected. For those con­
structs which anthropocentrism is supposedly unrelated to, insignificant 
correlations would be expected. Accordingly, the hypotheses were as 
follows.
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1. The extraction of a broad homogeneous "anthropocentrism'1 factor was 
expected from a factor analysis of the Anthropocentrism Scale.
2. An insignificant correlation between anthropocentrism and social 
desirability set was hypothesized.
3. A significant positive correlation was hypothesized between anthro­
pocentric attitudes (as measured by the Anthropocentrism Scale) and 
various behaviors thought to be reflective of an anthropocentric stance, 
whereas a significant negative correlation was expected between anthro­
pocentric attitudes and nonanthropocentric behavior.
4. Regarding Kameron's factors, (a) A significant positive correlation 
was expected between anthropocentrism and Factor 1 (conservationist- 
exploitationist); (b) A significant positive correlation was hypothesized 
between anthropocentrism and Factor 4 (anti-technology-pro-technology); 
(c) No hypotheses were advanced regarding the relation between anthro­
pocentrism and Factors 2 and 3. Scores on these factors among persons 
scoring low on the Anthropocentrism Scale were, however, considered 
likely to clarify the meaning of low Anthropocentrism Scale scores.
5. Regarding internal-external locus of control, a significant negative 
correlation was hypothesized between anthropocentrism and locus of 
control (where high scores indicate an external locus).
6 . A significant positive correlation was expected between anthropo­
centrism and egocentrism (as defined above).
7. A significant positive correlation was hypothesized between anthro­
pocentrism and ethnocentrism.
8 . An insignificant correlation between anthropocentrism and positivity 
of one's philosophy of human nature was hypothesized.
METHOD
Study #1: Factor Analysis
Subjects
Data previously collected during the initial standardization of 
the Anthropocentrism Scale (Chandler, Note 1) was used for the current 
factor analysis. Subjects included 49 Marquette University under­
graduate students (13 male, 36 female), and 136 Louisiana State Univer­
sity undergraduates (54 male, 82 female). All subjects were volunteers 
from lower level psychology courses, although most of the LSU partici­
pants were provided the nominal incentive of two points extra course 
credit for their research participation. Complete confidentiality of 
data was promised, and was guaranteed by asking students not to write 
their names on the test protocols.
Instrument
The Anthropocentrism Scale (Chandler, Note 1), a 30 item Likert 
format scale (see Appendix A).
Procedure
The factor analytic procedure initially involved a principal com­
ponents analysis, using intercorrelations among the 30 items of the 
Anthropocentrism Scale as the initial correlation matrix (total score on 
the Anthropocentrism Scale was not included as a 31st variable in this 
matrix). An initial eigenvalue cutoff of 1.0, followed by a Scree test 
(Cattell (1966), were then used to determine the number of factors to be 
retained. Subsequently an orthogonal (varimax procedure) and an oblique 
(promax procedure) rotation were performed to determine which rotation
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would yield more meaningful, interpretable factors. Factor scores were 
then derived from the data obtained from the varimax rotation. Of the 
various methods for computing factor scores, the following straight­
forward procedure was used. For each item contributing to a given factor, 
item score was multiplied by the factor loading of that item on that 
factor. The sum of these products was the factor score of an individual 
on that factor. In order to avoid substantial correlations between 
factor scores for various factors, each item was used in the scoring of 
only one factor. Criteria for assignment of a given item to a given 
factor were as follows.
For each factor, the item loading highest on that factor was used 
in scoring that factor.
Secondly, items were not used in the scoring of any factor unless 
a significant (r = .228, given df = 73) factor loading was obtained for 
that item on the factor in question.
Thirdly, each item was used in the scoring of whatever factor on 
which it loaded highest. The one exception to this rule was as follows. 
An attempt was made to include three items in the scoring of each factor. 
An item which loads highest on hypothetical factor Q was to be used 
instead in the scoring of hypothetical factor Z, if two criteria were met: 
(a) if that item was needed to provide a second or third item for scoring 
of factor Z, and (b) if that item was not a major contributor (factor 
loading of .50 or above) to factor Q.
Finally, for any uninterpretable factors, items which would have 
loaded on that factor were to be used in scoring other factors, subject 
to other applicable rules for item assignment.
42
Study #2: Construct Correlations
Subjects
Subjects included 37 male and 37 female volunteers enrolled in 
an Introductory Psychology course at LSU.
Instruments
1. The Anthropocentrism Scale (Appendix A) was used as a mea­
sure of anthropocentrism, with high total scores indicating a high 
level of anthropocentrism, and a low score indicating a relatively 
nonanthropocentric individual.
2. Kameron's (1975) scale (see Appendix C) was used to measure 
five separate variables. This scale is a 126 item scale including 93 
man-nature value orientation items, as well as the 33 items of the 
Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964), combined in a 
random sort. Scores on the following five variables were obtained 
using Kameron's scale: (a) Factor 1 (conservationist vs. exploits-
tionist). where high scores indicate an exploitationist stance; (b) 
Factor 2 (non man-under-nature vs. man-under nature and hostile toward 
animals). where high scores indicate a man-under-nature and hostile 
toward animals orientation; (c) Factor 3 (non fear of outdoors vs. 
fear of outdoors), where high scores indicate fear of outdoors; (d) 
Factor 4 (anti-technology vs. pro-technology). where high scores 
indicate a pro-technology stance and (e) Social desirability set, with 
high scores indicating a strong tendency to give socially desirable 
answers. For an examination of the factor loadings of individual 
items on these factors, see Kameron (1975).
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3. Rotter's (1966) Internal-External Control Scale was used to 
measure locus of control (see Appendix D). High scores on this scale 
indicate an external locus of control.
4. Egocentrism, defined as preoccupation with oneself and 
one's own needs, was measured using Exner's (1973) Self Focus Sentence 
Completion. The sentence stems for this task are provided in Appendix 
B, while scoring procedures can be located in Exner (1973). The 
scoring procedures yield an "egocentric balance" score, a difference 
score requiring subtraction of the number of external world focused 
responses from the number of self focused responses. Positive d 
scores thus are indicative of an egocentric stance, whereas negative 
scores indicate a tendency to focus on the external world at the 
expense of oneself.
5. The Xenophobia Scale (Campbell & McCandless, 1951) was 
employed as a measure of ethnocentrism. It should be noted that this 
measure taps outgroup rejection but does not measure ingroup loyalty
as some measures do (such as the now outdated E-Scale of Adorno et al.). 
Items of the Xenophobia Scale were developed in such a way that atti­
tudes toward different outgroups can be measured. Outgroups included 
in this study were Whites, Blacks, Mexicans, Iranians, and Jews/ 
Christians. Each person was asked to respond to the standard 25 items 
(see Appendix F) for each of four outgroups, with his ingroup excluded. 
For example, a White Jewish individual would be asked to respond to 
items regarding Blacks, Mexicans, Iranians, and Christians, whereas 
non-Jews would be asked to respond to Iranians, Jews, and two of the 
three racial groups (their own racial group excluded). High scores on
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the Xenophobia Scale indicate a high level of ethnocentrism.
6. The Favorability score from the PHN Scale (Wrightsman,
1964) was used as a measure of favorability of one's attitudes 
toward human nature. High scores indicate a positive, favorable view 
of human nature, whereas low scores indicate an unfavorable view.
See Appendix H for PHN Scale content.
7. A form requesting a variety of demographic information (see 
Appendix I) was also administered, seeking data on the following 
variables: age, sex, major subject area at LSU, race, religious 
preference, political ideology (liberal-conservative), political 
party preference (Democrat, Republican, Independent), and parent's 
socio-economic status.
8 . A list of primarily ecologically related behaviors was also 
presented to each subject, with the research participant being asked 
whether he does or does not engage in each behavior. This Environ­
mental Behavior List (EBL) included eight items from the Actual 
Commitment Subscale of the Ecology Scale (Mahoney et al., 1975), as 
well as other items developed as part of this study. The behavioral 
items are presented in Appendix G, accompanied by scoring criteria. 
Three scores can be derived from each subject's EBL responses: (a) an 
Anthropocentric Behavior Score, based on responses to 11 items describ­
ing supposedly anthropocentric behaviors, with high scores indicating 
reported involvement in anthropocentric behaviors, (b) a Nonanthropo- 
centric Behavior Score, based on responses to 20 items describing 
supposedly nonanthropocentric behaviors, with high scores indicating 
reported engagement in nonanthropocentric behaviors, and (c) a total
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EBL score, based on responses to all 31 items, with high scores indi­
cating involvement in anthropocentric behaviors but not in nonanthro­
pocentric behaviors, while low scores indicate involvement in 
nonanthropocentric behaviors but not in anthropocentric behaviors.
Procedure
Volunteers interested in gaining extra credit in their Intro­
ductory Psychology course were asked to sign up to take part in an 
"attitude survey." Once assembled, subjects were given a packet 
including each of the eight instruments described above. Subjects 
were assured of complete anonymity and were asked not to write their 
names on any of the forms. Each instrument in a given packet was 
labeled with a specific number, and subjects were asked to write down 
their identifying number in order to identify their profile in a later, 
optional group feedback session. All instruments were given to all 
volunteers, with the data being collected in October and November of 
1980, two to three months prior to the resolution of the American- 
Iranian hostage crisis (in which the American embassy in Tehran was 
seized by Iranian militants). Regarding the sequence of administra­
tion of instruments, the demographics form appeared first, followed by 
the Anthropocentrism Scale, for all subjects. Similarly, the Xeno­
phobia Scale appeared last for all subjects, and the Environmental 
Behavior List appeared next to last for all subjects. The remaining 
four instruments were arranged in each of the possible 24 sequences, 
with each sequence being repeated at least three times among the 74 
subjects. This sequencing of the eight instruments was designed to 
reduce unnecessary biasing of Anthropocentrism Scale responses, to
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reduce biasing caused by familiarity with the relatively face valid 
Xenophobia Scale, and to control (via counterbalancing) any order 
effects among the four instruments sandwiched between these two scales.
The relationship between Anthropocentrism Scale total score and 
each of the major continuous variables (Kameron's factors, locus of 
control, egocentrism, ethnocentrism, EBL score, PHN favorability, and 
socioeconomic status) was assessed via Pearson product-moment corre­
lation coefficients, using .05 as the minimum level of significance.
In addition, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted comparing 
high (top 27%), medium (middle 46%), and low (bottom 27%)anthropocen­
trism groups on each of the above variables, with Duncan Multiple 
Range Tests used to identify the source of any significant findings.
In the event of a nonsignificant product-moment correlation, such an 
ANOVA was considered potentially useful in identifying any curvilinear 
trend between anthropocentrism and the dependent variable in question. 
Similar product-moment correlations and ANOVAs were obtained for each 
of the interpretable factors derived from the Anthropocentrism Scale, 
relating each of these factors to each of the continuous variables 
listed above.
The relationship between total score on the Anthropocentrism 
Scale and each of the categorical variables (sex, race, religion, 
political party preference, and political ideology) was assessed using 
a separate ANOVA for each of these five independent variables, with 
Duncan Multiple Range Tests again used to identify significant differ­
ences between groups in the event of a significant F-test. Similar 
sets of ANOVAs were conducted for each of the interpretable
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Anthropocentrism Scale factors, thereby testing the significance of 
the relationship between each factor and each categorical variable.
In addition, biserial correlations were obtained to ascertain 
the nature of the relationship between Anthropocentrism Scale total 
score and each EBL item. Finally, a stepwise regression analysis was 
conducted, using all nonenvironmental continuous variables (ethnocen- 
trism, egocentrism, PHN Favorability, locus of control, and socio­
economic status) to predict total score on the Anthropocentrism Scale. 
In the same vein, a canonical correlational analysis was to be conducted 
as well, relating these same nonenvironmental continuous variables 
(predictors) to the factors derived from the Anthropocentrism Scale 
(criterion variables).
RESULTS
Study #1; Factor Analysis
A principal components analysis yielded nine factors (based on 
an eigenvalue cutoff value of 1.0 as well as a Scree test) which 
account for 58.9% of the total variance on the Anthropocentrism Scale. 
Table 1 lists the eigenvalues and variance accounted for by each of 
these nine factors, as well as the correlation between factor scores 
and total score on the Anthropocentrism Scale.
A comparison of results of the principal components analysis, 
an orthogonal (varimax) rotation, and an oblique (promax) rotation 
indicates that all three methods produce an easily interpretable first 
factor. Beyond this first factor, however, rotated data is clearly 
more meaningful, with the varimax rotation providing slight advantages 
over the promax rotation in regard to meaningfulness and interpret- 
ability of factors. Accordingly, all data reported below are those 
resulting from the varimax orthogonal rotation. The factor structure 
matrix resulting from this varimax procedure is reproduced in Table 2.
Factor #1, accounting for 19.8% of the variance, is perhaps best 
identified as a "pure anthropocentrism vs. nonanthropocentrism" factor. 
Reference to Table 1 indicates that this factor correlates .827 with 
total score on the Anthropocentrism Scale. Furthermore, reference to 
Table 3 indicates that the five highest loading items on Factor #1 each 
contains an abstract value judgement maintaining the superiority or 
importance of human life relative to other life forms. Since this value 
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Total Score on 
Anthropocen­
trism Scale
1 5.94 19.8 19.8 .827a
2 2.16 7.2 27.0 .513a
3 1.91 6.4 33.4 .502a
4 1.57 5.2 38.6 .669a
5 1.36 4.5 43.2 .254d
6 1.28 4.3 47.4 .254d
7 1.21 4.0 51.5 .433a
8 1.13 3.8 55.2 ,602a
9 1.09 3.6 58.9 • 496a
Significant at the .0001 level 
Significant at the .001 level 
Significant at the .01 level 
Significant at the .05 level
50
Table 2







#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9
1 .106 .040 .101 .086 .924 .055 .031 .002 .016
2 .185 .013 .772 .022 .130 -.102 .003 .062 .016
3 .303 .080 -.050 -.032 .032 .058 .073 -.176 .351
4 .500 .068 -.023 -.007 .040 .041 .354 .030 .067
5 .121 .045 -.022 .360 .103 .190 .249 .078 .155
6 .551 -.158 .110 .046 .200 .239 .154 .255 .399
7 .055 .214 -.058 .112 -.017 -.119 -.012 .565 .025
8 -.038 .610 -.076 -.028 .057 -.008 .111 .201 .037
9 .410 .056 .366 .045 .043 .005 -.252 .219 .273
10 .056 .274 .201 .352 .043 .167 .159 .104 .131
11 .182 .278 -.197. .035 .198 .122 -..265 .070 .126
12 .285 .239 .193 .196 .153 .024 .527 .083 .123
13 .104 .105 -.002 .220 .198 .036 .218 .429 -.054
14 .705 .183 .176 .138 .131 .068 .065 -.054 -.071
15 .035 .051 .712 -.003 .084 .084 .075 -.098 .035
16 .110 .281 .221 .364 .017 .222 .066 .289 .124
17 .484 .002 .027 -.034 -.004 .220 -.086 -.029 -.139
18 .279 .044 .155 .221 .163 .170 .217 .,228 -.038
19 .075 .113 .150 .341 -.031 .059 .101 -.087 .402
20 .154 .062 -.034 .027 .086 .780 .012 -.032 .037
21 .328 .291 .053 .046 .012 .228 -.076 .192 .205
22 .666 -.023 .040 .148 .078 .141 -.001 .035 .138
23 .162 ' .087 -.080 .192 .058 -.030 .266 .058 -.057
24 .119 .025 -.020 .675 .132 .044 -.009 .180 .006
25 .247 .008 -.044 .175 .029 .050 .038 -.074 .005
26 .254 .572 .231 .176 .090 .165 .044 -.011 -.065
27 .122 .146 .386 -.128 -.146 .110 .179 -.049 -.134
28 .127 .055 -.020 J lL L .129 -.066 .090 -.072 .019
29 .627 .111 .132 .045 .069 .001 .074 .046 -.013
30 .438 .358 .236 .148 .000 -.057 .108 .051 .050
aUnderlined factor loadings indicate those items which are retained in 
the derivation of factor scores for each factor.
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Table 3
Anthropocentrism Scale Factor #1;
Significant3 Factor Loadings
Item #k Item Content FactorLoading0
#14 Humans are superior to all other animals in 
all important respects.
.705
#22 No matter how superiority is defined, it seems 
that man must be considered superior to all 
known forms of life.
.666
#29 Man is the most significant entity in the 
universe.
.627
#06 Man is the most important species on earth. .551
#04 The human species is without a doubt the most 
advanced form of life on earth.
.500
#17 Degree of intelligence ought to be the main 
measure for determining the superiority of 
one species over another.
.484
#30 The primary value of an animal or plant lies in 
its ability to serve human needs.
.438
#09 If we eventually discover life in other parts of 
of the universe, such life will probably be 
found to be inferior to human life.
.410
#21 Governments should adopt policies which ensure 
the survival of the human species, even if 
other species become extinct as a result.
.328
QFactor loadings above .228 are significant at the .05 level 
given df * 73.
^Underlined item numbers indicate items whose scoring is 
reversed prior to application of other statistical procedures. 
Agreement with these items thus results in a low raw item score.
cLoadings of items used in derivation of factor scores for 
Factor #1 are underlined.
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Table 3 (continued)
Item #b_____________________ Item Content_____________________Loading^
#03 Man should control the environment for his own .303
benefit as much as possible.
#12 It is best to think of man as just one of many .285
members of the animal world.
#18 If there actually is an afterlife, animals are .279
just as likely as humans to take part in such 
a life after death.
#26 Many animals and plants are far more advanced .254
than most people like to believe.
#25 If I could choose my own afterlife, I would like .247
to be something other than a human being for a 
change.
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non of a truly anthropocentric stance, it is appropriate to label Factor 
1 a "pure anthropocentrism vs. nonanthropocentrism" factor. High 
factor scores indicate a relatively anthropocentric stance (in the 
labelling of factors, the first of the two bipolar terms will in each 
instance refer to the anthropocentric stance).
Factor #2 accounts for 7.2% of the total variance, but is somewhat 
less clearcut in its meaning than is Factor #1. It is apparent, however, 
that whereas items loading high on Factor #1 are positively scored and 
are focused on man in their content, the two items which load highest on 
Factor #2 (see Table 4) are both negatively scored and focus on animals 
and plants. Since the specific focus of these items is on the adapta­
tion and level of development of animals and plants, Factor #2 is 
labelled "other species poorly adapted vs. well adapted and advanced" 
(with high factor scores indicating a belief that other species are 
relatively poorly adapted).
Factor #3 accounts for 6.4% of the total variance, and is clearly 
a content specific "extraterrestial life unlikely vs. likely" factor.
The two items having high loadings on Factor #3 each explicitely refers 
to the likelihood of life beyond earth (see Table 5). High factor 
scores indicate a belief that extraterrestial life is unlikely.
Factor #4 accounts of 5.2% of the variance. Items which load 
on this factor (see Table 6) are each negatively scored, and contain 
fairly homogeneous content referring to a concern that death of and 
damage to plants and animals be avoided. Accordingly, Factor #4 is 
labelled "low vs. high concern for animals and plants," with high factor 
scores indicating low concern.
Table 4
Anthropocentrism Scale Factor #2: 
Significant3 Factor Loadings
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Item Item Content FactorLoading0
# 8 Most animals and plants seem to be better 
adapted to their environments 
than man is to his environment.
.610
#26 Many animals and plants are far more advanced 
than most people like to believe.
.572
#30 The primary value of an animal or plant lies 
in its ability to serve human needs.
.358
#21 Governments should adopt policies which ensure 
the survival of the human species, even if 
other species become extinct as a result.
.291
#16 I sometimes feel that the killing of an animal 
is just as wrong as the killing of a human 
being.
.281
#11 Man is better equipped to survive environmental 
disasters than any other species.
.278
#10 Humans should show more respect for the rights 
of animals and plants.
.274
#12 It is best to think of man as just one of many 
members of the animal world.
.239
aFactor loadings above .228 are significant at the .05 level given df = 73.
^Underlined item numbers indicate items whose scoring is reversed 
prior to application of other statistical procedures. Agreement with 
these items thus results in a low raw item score.
°Loadings of items used in the derivation of factor scores for 
Factor #2 are underlined.
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Table 5
Anthropocentrism Scale Factor #3:
Significant3 Factor Loadings
Item Item Content FactorLoading0
#02 It is quite possible that highly advanced 
civilizations exist in other parts of the 
universe.
.772
#15 It is likely that "flying saucers" are 
presently visiting earth.
.712
#27 I usually enjoy science fiction novels and 
films.
.386
#09 If we eventually discover life in other parts 
of the universe, such life will probably be 
found to be inferior to human life.
.366
#30 The primary value of an animal or plant lies 
in its ability to serve human needs.
.236
#26 Many animals and plants are far more advanced 
than most people like to believe.
.231
aFactor loadings above .228 are significant at the .05 level 
given df = 73.
Underlined item numbers indicate items whose scoring is 
reversed prior to application of other statistical procedures. Agree 
ment with these items thus results in a low raw item score.
cLoadings of items used in the derivation of factor scores for
Factor #3 are underlined.
56
Table 6
Anthropocentrism Scale Factor #4:
Significant3 Factor Loadings
Item Item Content FactorLoading3
#24 I occasionally feel that it is morally wrong 
to eat meat.
.675
#28 Sometimes my conscience prevents me from 
killing bothersome flies and insects.
.617
#16 I sometimes feel that the killing of an animal 
is just as wrong as the killing of a human 
being.
.364
#05 It is wrong to pick flowers for their beauty 
value, because in so doing, we destroy the 
life of the flower.
.360
#10 . Humans should show more respect for the rights 
of animals and plants.
.352
#19 Protecting the environment is more important 
than the production of consumer goods.
.341
aFactor loadings above .228 are significant at the .05 level 
given df = 73.
^Underlined item numbers indicate items whose scoring is reversed 
prior to application of other statistical procedures. Agreement with 
these items thus results in a low raw item score.
cLoadings of items used in the derivation of factor scores for
Factor #4 are underlined.
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Factor #5 is a singlet whose only significant loading is derived 
from item #1, dealing with the similarities and differences between man 
and animals. Since this factor is derived from only one significantly 
loading item, and thus does not constitute a true factor, factor scores 
are not derived for "factor" #5. Similarly Factor #6 is a singlet whose 
only significant loading is derived from item #20 dealing with prefer­
ence for city or country life. Again, since the scoring of factor #6 
would involve little more than a transformation of the data obtained for 
this one item, factor scores are not derived for this "factor."
Factor #7 is a doublet accounting for 4.0% of the total variance 
on the Anthropocentrism Scale. The composition of this factor is some­
what varied and difficult to interpret if all significantly loading 
items are taken into consideration (see Table 7). However, since 
scoring of this factor relies on only two of these items, interpretation 
is somewhat easier. Since high scorers on factor #7 tend to deny that 
man is just a member of the animal world, and that the universe would 
be better off without humans, this factor is labelled "man unique and 
harmless vs. man as destructive animal." Given the fact that only two 
items contribute to this factor, caution is advised in its utilization.
Factor #8 accounts for 3.87* of the total variance and is similar 
in content to Factor #4, in that high loading items are each negatively 
phrased and reflect concern regarding the death of animals. Unlike 
Factor #4, however, items contributing to Factor #8 generally refer to 
situations where human welfare (cure for diseases, avoidance of auto 
injury) and the welfare of animals are mutually exclusive options. 
Accordingly, Factor #8 is labelled ,!welfare of humans vs. welfare of
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Table 7
Anthropocentrism Scale Factor #7:
Significant3 Factor Loadings
Item #b Item Content FactorLoading3
#12 It is best to think of man as just one of 
many members of the animal world.
.527
#04 The human species is without a doubt the most 
advanced form of life on earth.
.354
#23 The universe would be much better off if 
humans did not exist.
.266
#11 Man is better equipped to survive environmental 
disorders than any other species.
-.265
#09 If we eventually discover life in other parts 
of the universe, such life will probably be 
found to be inferior to human life.
-.252
#05 It is wrong to pick flowers for their beauty 
value, because in so doing, we destroy the 
life of the flower.
.249
aFactor loadings above .228 are significant at the .05 level 
given df = 73.
^Underlined item numbers indicate items whose scoring is reversed 
prior to application of other statistical procedures. Agreement with 
these items thus results in a low raw item score.
QLoadings of items used in the derivation of factor scores for
Factor #7 are underlined.
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Table 8
Anthropocentrism Scale Factor #8:
Significant3 Factor Loadings
Item Item Content FactorLoading3
# 7 It is wrong for scientists to try to find 
cures for human diseases by experimentally 
producing these diseases in animals.
.565
#13 When driving a car, one should go out of his 
way to avoid animals crossing the road, even 
at the risk of an accident with another 
automobile.
.429
#16 I sometimes feel that the killing of an animal 
is just as wrong as the killing of a human 
being.
.289
# 6 Han is the most important species on earth. .255
#18 If there actually is an afterlife, animals are 
just as likely as humans to take part in 
such a life after death.
.228
aFactor loadings above .228 are significant at the .05 level 
given df = 73.
bUnderlined item numbers indicate items whose scoring is reversed 
prior to application of other statistical procedures. Agreement with 
these items thus results in a low raw item score.
cLoadings of items used in the derivation of factor scores for
Factor #8 are underlined.
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animals," with high factor scores indicating a strong emphasis on the 
welfare of humans.
Finally, Factor #9 accounts for 3.6% of the total variance, with 
the content of significantly loading items generally referring to the 
options of using the environment for man's benefit, or protecting the 
environment. Factor #9 is therefore labelled "exploitation vs. 
protection of the environment," with high factor scores indicative of 
an exploitationist position. Again, caution should be used in the use 
of factor 9, since it is derived from only two items.
Additional information regarding the meaning of these Anthropo­
centrism Scale factors is available in the correlations obtained between 
factor scores and other variables during the course of Study #2.
Study #2: Construct Correlations
Results of correlational analyses relevant to hypotheses two 
through nine are presented in Table 10, and are as follows:
Regarding hypothesis #2, no significant relationship was found 
between social desirability set and total score on the Anthropocentrism 
Scale (r = .159, N.S.).
Regarding hypothesis #3, a significant linear relationship was 
found,as predicted, between total score on the Environmental Behavior 
List (EBL) and total score on the Anthropocentrism Scale (r = .549, 
p <.0001). Total score on the Anthropocentrism Scale was also signif- 
cantly correlated with both the Anthropocentric Behavior Score 
(r = .500, p<.0001) and the Nonanthropocentric Behavior Score 
(r = -.470, p<.0001) derived from the EBL. Analysis of biserial corre­
lations between total score on the Anthropocentrism Scale and response
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Table 9
Anthropocentrism Scale Factor #9: 
Significant3 Factor Loadings
Item Item Content FactorLoading0
£11 Protecting the environment is more important than the production of consumer goods.
.402
# 6 Man is the most important species on earth. .399
# 3 Man should control the environment for his own 
benefit as much as possible.
.351
# 9 If we eventually discover life in other parts 
of the universe, such life will probably be 
found to be inferior to human life.
.273
£Factor loadings above .228 are significant at the .05 level 
given df = 73.
^Underlined item numbers indicate items whose scoring is reversed 
prior to application of other statistical procedures. Agreement with 
these items thus results in a low raw item score.
cLoadings of items used in the derivation of factor scores for 
Factor #9 are underlined.
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Table 10




Total Score on 
Anthropocentrism Scale
Social Desirability Set .159
Environmental Behavior List Total Score .549a
Anthropocentric Behavior Score from EBL .500a
Nonanthropocentric Behavior Score from EBL -.470a
KF1 : Conservationist vs. Exploitationist .599a
KF2 : Non Man Under Nature vs. Man Under and 
Hostile toward Nature
.333°
KF3 : Non Fear of Outdoors vs. Fear of Outdoors .583a
KF4 : Anti-Technoloev vs. Pro-Technoloev .430a





Significant at .0001 level 
Significant at .001 level 
cSignifleant at .01 level
Significant at .05 level
eUnderlined term indicates the meaning of a high score on a 
given variable.
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to individual EBL items (see Table 11) indicates that 12 of the 31 EBL 
items were significantly correlated with anthropocentrism. Of the 11 
items describing supposedly anthropocentric behavior, 6 were signifi­
cantly positively correlated with total score on the Anthropocentrism 
Scale, while 6 of the 20 items describing supposedly nonanthropocentric 
behavior were significantly negatively correlated with total score on 
the Anthropocentrism Scale.
Regarding hypothesis #4, a significant positive correlation was 
found between total score on the Anthropocentrism Scale, and score on 
each of the four Kameron factors (KFl, KF2, KF3, and KF4). As pre­
dicted, a significant linear relationship was detected between KFl 
(Conservationist vs. Exp1oitationist) and anthropocentrism (r = .599,
£ <.0001), indicating that highly anthropocentric individuals tend to 
endorse exploitation of the environment. Likewise, the hypothesis of 
a significant positive correlation between KF3 (Anti-technology vs. 
Pro-technology) was confirmed (r = .430, £<.0001), indicating that 
highly anthropocentric individuals tend to support the growth of 
technology. Although no hypotheses were advanced regarding the other 
Kameron factors, results indicate that anthropocentric individuals tend 
to endorse the "man under and hostile toward nature" position (anthropo- 
centrism:r:KF2 = .333, £<.01), and tend to be fearful of the outdoors 
as well (anthropocentrism:r:KF3 = .583, £<.0001).
Regarding hypothesis #5, results do not support the prediction 
that anthropocentric individuals would display an internal locus of 
control. Data reveal an insignificant correlation between internal- 
external locus of control and total score on the Anthropocentrism Scale
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Table 11
Biserial Correlations between Total Score on the Anthropocentrism 
Scale, and Response to Environmental Behavior List Items
BBL Item Content Item #
Biserial 
Correlation 
Percent of with Total 
Sample Who Score on 
Responded Anthropocen- 
"True" trism Scale
1. I keep track of my senators' and con­
gressman's voting records on 
environmental issues. 9.5 .079
2 ,a I have used, pesticides to protect my 
plants when necessary. 68.9 .277
3. I subscribe to one or more ecological 
publications. 16.2 - .406°
4. I can clearly remember having bought a 
product specifically because it had a 
lower polluting effect. 51.4 -.438b
5 .3 I kill cockroaches when they appear in my 
living quarters. 91.9 .147
6 . I go out of my way to buy products in 
recyclable containers, despite the 
hassle. 13.5 -.113
7. I have attended at least one meeting 
concerned with ecological or environ­
mental issues. 40.5 -.359c
8. I save newspapers for collection during 
paper recycling drives. 76.2 -.297
and
Indicates items describe supposedly anthropocentric behaviors, 
which therefore contribute to the Anthropocentric Behavior
Score. All other items describe supposedly non anthropocentric 
behavior and contribute to the Nonanthropocentric Behavior Score.
^Significant at the .01 level.













13. I keep my thermostat set at 78 degrees or
above in the summer, and 65 degrees or 
below in the winter, in order to con­
serve energy and reduce pollution.
14. I have attended an anti-nuclear power
meeting.
15. I have written to a newspaper or legistator




16.a I often buy products contained in no deposit/
no return bottles. 74.3








9 . Because of my beliefs regarding the 
effects of overpopulation, I will 
limit the size of my family to two 
children or less.
10.a I have used aerosol cans occasionally
during the last few years.
11. When possible, I prefer to drive a fairly
large car rather than an economy size 
car.
12.a When I vote, I'm more likely to support a
candidate who supports growth of the 
economy and business, than a candidate 
who supports putting controls on business 











dSignificance cannot be tested since the percent of "true" 





EBL Sample Who 








18. I have at times taken a bus or bicycle 
across town, even when I had a car 
available to me, in order to reduce 
pollution of the environment. 54.1 -,386b
19. I have been involved in at least one 
litter cleanup drive. 70.3 -.217
20. I have contributed money to an organi­
zation whose main task is to protect 
the natural environment. 28.4 -.321c
21.a If I'm honest with myself, I have to 
admit that I sometimes throw small 
pieces of litter on the ground, or out 
of my car window. 85.1 .388c
22. I have at times boycotted products because 
they were made by companies found 
guilty of damaging the natural environ­
ment. 18.9 -.293
23. I have used a recycling center for bottles 
or cans at least once within the last 
year. 16.2 -.250
24.a When I think about it, I realize that I do 
little or nothing to protect or improve 
the environment. 67.6 -.071
25. I am willing to put a brick in my toilet 
in order to reduce its water consump­
tion, and I will do so soon. 13.5 -.339
26.a Even though use of carpools, buses, bikes, 
etc. reduce pollution, I prefer the 
convenience of a car. 58.1 ,390b
27. I have reduced my electricity consumption 















28. I am very willing to pay, out of my 
own earnings, an additional tax of 
50 dollars a year, to be used 
specifically to improve the natural 
environment. 51.4 -.251
29.3 I don't go out of my way to protect the 
environment, since that's the 
government's j ob. 18.9 ■ 451b
30. I can remember a period in my life when
I was a vegetarian because 1 felt it 
was morally wrong to eat meat.
31.a I turn on my air conditioner or heater
when the temperature is uncomfortable 







(r = .030, N.S.). Furthermore, an ANOVA examining the locus of control 
of high, middle, and low anthropocentrism groups indicates no signifi­
cant differences among these groups (F ® 0.30, N.S.), thereby ruling 
out the possibility of a curvilinear relationship as well.
Hypothesis #6 was also unsupported by the data. Results indicate 
an insignificant correlation between egocentrism and total score on the 
Anthropocentrism Scale (r = -.073, N.S.). Again, an ANOVA used to 
explore the possibility of a curvilinear trend between egocentrism and 
anthropocentrism showed no significant difference between high, middle, 
and low anthropocentrism groups in level of egocentrism (F = 0.19, N.S.). 
Thus, results indicate that egocentrism and anthropocentrism are not 
related to each other in either a linear or a curvilinear fashion.
Regarding hypothesis #7, a positive correlation was found, as 
predicted, between overall ethnocentrism and total score on the Anthropo­
centrism Scale (r = .358, £  ^.01). Table 12 contains a summary of the 
relationship between anthropocentrism and ethnocentrism in regard to 
each of the six outgroups examined in this study. As indicated, a sig­
nificant direct relationship was established between anthropocentrism 
and tendency to reject each of four major outgroups: Iranians, Mexi­
cans, Blacks, and Jews. Inadequate sampling of Jewish subjects 
prevented assessment of the relation between anthropocentrism and 
tendency to reject Christian outgroups, while anthropocentrism was found 
to be unrelated to rejection of Whites, a conclusion based on data 
collected from four Black subjects.
Regarding hypothesis #8, the prediction of a nonsignificant 
correlation between anthropocentrism and favorability of one's philosophy
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Table 12






Total Score on 
Anthropocentrism Scale
Overall Ethnocentrism 74 -9.14 .358a
Rejection of Iranians 74 3.99 .360s
Rejection of Mexicans 74 -14.77 .294b
Rejection of Blacks 70 0.77 .283b
Rejection of Jews 73 -27.62 ,248b
Rejection of Whites 4 11.25 -.209
Rejection of Christians 1 - 8.00
Significant at .01 level.
^Significant at .05 level.
cHigh positive scores indicate intense rejection of the 
outgroup in question, whereas high negative scores indicate relative 
acceptance of an outgroup.
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of human nature was confirmed by the data (r = .092, N.S.). An ANOVA 
examining the favorability of attitudes regarding human nature of high, 
medium, and low anthropocentrism groups found no significant difference
between groups (F = 1.17, N.S.). Thus, there is no evidence of a
linear or curvilinear relationship between anthropocentrism and favor­
ability of one's philosophy of human nature. An examination of the
subscales on the Philosophies of Human Nature Scale revealed that
attitudes regarding the trustworthiness, altruism, independence, 
strength of will and rationality, and complexity of human nature were 
unrelated to total score on the Anthropocentrism Scale. However, 
anthropocentrism was significantly related to belief in the variability 
of human nature (r = -.314, £<.01). That is, highly anthropocentric 
individuals tend to minimize the extent of individual differences in, 
and the basic changeability of human nature.
Results are also available regarding the relationship between 
anthropocentrism and various demographic variables. First of all, data 
indicate no significant relationship between socioeconomic status and 
total score on the Anthropocentrism Scale (r *» .130, N.S.). Relation­
ships between anthropocentrism and various categorical demographic 
variables are summarized in Table 13. ANOVA's indicate no significant 
difference in level of anthropocentrism as a function of sex, religion, 
race, political party, or political ideology.
Results of a stepwise regression analysis designed to predict 
total score on the Anthropocentrism Scale are summarized in Table 14.
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Table 13
Separate ANOVA's Relevant to Relationships between 




X Total Score 
Score on 
Anthr op oce'ntr i sm 
Scale F Value E.
Sex Males 37 128.6 0.23 N.S.
Females 37 126.3
Religion Catholics 43 131.1
Protestants 20 125.5 1.35 N.S.
None 6 118.8
Jewish 1 101.0
Race Whites 70 126.9 0.75 N.S.
Blacks 4 136.5
Political Republicans 29 128.8
Party Democrats 30 131.3 2.10 N.S.
Preference Independents 13 117.1
Political Liberals 32 125.9 0.30 N.S.
Ideology Conservatives 42 128.6
aThe mean total score on the Anthropocentrism Scale for all 74 
subjects was 127.5, with a standard deviation of 21.4
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Table 14
Stepvd.se3 Regression Analysis for Prediction of 
Total Score on the Anthropocentrism Scale
Step Variable Entered R2 F R
1 Ethnocentrism .146 11.97 .0009
2 PHN Favorability .175 7.33 .0013
3 Egocentrism .198 '5.60 .0018
4 Socioeconomic Status .203 4.27 .0039
5 Locus of Control .203 3.36 .0092
aEach step adds one variable, and includes all variables used in 
previous steps. Thus, for example, Step 3 involves the use of 
ethnocentrism, PHN favorability, and egocentrism to predict total 
score on the Anthropocentrism Scale.
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These five nonenvironmantal variables (Ethnocentrism, PHN Favorability, 
Egocentrism, Socioeconomic Status, and Locus of Control) account for 
20.3% of the variance in Anthropocentrism Scale total scores. However, 
the one variable model, using only ethnocentrism as a predictor, 
accounts for 14.6% of the variance by itself. Given the declining F 
values and the minimal increases in as one proceeds toward step 5, 
it is evident that little is to be gained by the addition of predictor 
variables other than ethnocentrism. This is not surprising given the 
data reported above, which indicates that ethnocentrism is the only one 
of the five variables used in this regression analysis which correlates 
significantly with total score on the Anthropocentrism Scale.
Data regarding the correlations between Anthropocentrism Scale 
factors and other variables are summarized in Table 15, while signifi­
cant relationships between Anthropocentrism Scale factors and categori­
cal demographic variables are summarized in Table 16. In regard to 
Factor #1: "Pure Anthropocentrism vs. Nonanthropocentrism," the
obtained correlations are quite similar to those obtained between total 
score on the Anthropocentrism Scale and the set of variables in question. 
Factor #1 is positively correlated with ethnocentrism, with total score 
and both subscores derived from the Environmental Behavior List, and 
with each of the four Kameron factors. In other words, persons who 
score high on Factor 1 (high in pure anthropocentrism) tend to reject 
various outgroups, report involvement in anthropocentric behavior but 
deny nonanthropocentric behavior, and tend to take an exploitationist 
stance toward the environment including an endorsement of technological 
growth. Such persons also tend to be fearful of the outdoors while
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Table 15
Significant Product Moment Correlations between 
Anthropocentrism Scale Factors and 
Other Variables




Behavior Score .427a .285d .324c • 307c
Nonanthropocentric 
Behavior Score -,329c -,270d -.365° -.269d -.4403
Environmental 
Behavior List .418a .269d • 331c .337c .279d .442a
Total Score
KF1 ,436a .390b .571a .373° .376b
KF2 ,331c .294d














aSignificant at the .0001 level 
^Significant at the .001 level 
Significant at the .01 level 
^Significant at the .05 level
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Table 16
Significant3 ANOVAs Regarding Relationships between 
Anthropocentrism Scale Factor Scores and 
Categorical Demographic Variables
Anthropo­ Mean Results of
centrism Demographic Factor Duncan
Scale Variable Groups N Score F £ TestbFactor
AF #1 Religion Catholic 43 26.6 A
Protestant 20 24.7 3.24 p< .05 B A
None 6 20.3 B
Jewish 1 16.6 B
Political Republican 29 26.5 A
Party Democrat 30 25.7 3.24 p< .05 A
Preference Independent 13 21.7 B
AF #2 Religion None 6 6.83 A
Jewish 1 6.18 3.88 p< .05 B A
Catholic 43 4.76 B
Protestant 20 4.47 B
AF #3 Religion Catholic 43 6.85 A
Protestant 20 6.19 3.54 p< .05 A
Jewish 1 3.82 B A
None 6 3.39 B
Sex Females 37 7.08 6.50 p <  .05 A
Males 37 5.55 B
Political Democrats 30 7.07 A
Party Republicans 29 6.39 3.35 p <  .05 B
Preference Independents 13 4.84 B
AF #7 Political Conservatives 42 3.87 4.61 p<  .05 A
Ideology Liberals 32 3.37 B
aAll ANOVA’s, for all eight scored factors and all five demo­
graphic variables (sex, race, religion, political party, political 
ideology) which are not listed were not significant.
^Means with the same letter are not significantly different 
based on the Duncan Multiple Range Test.
76
endorsing a man under and hostile toward nature position. In addition, 
as indicated in Table 16, Catholics were found to score significantly 
higher on this pure anthropocentrism factor than did nonreligious and 
Jewish individuals. Finally, persons identifying themselves as Demo­
crats or Republicans scored significantly higher on Factor #1 than did 
persons identifying themselves as Independents. Factor #1 was unrelated 
to social desirability set, locus of control, egocentrism, PHN favor­
ability, socioeconomic status, sex, race, and political ideology.
Factor #2: "Other Species Poorly Adapted vs. Well Adapted and
Advanced," was significantly related to only two variables, social 
desirability set, and religion. A significant positive correlation was 
found between Factor #2 and social desirability set, indicating that 
persons who believe that other species are poorly adapted and relatively 
unadvanced tend to give socially desirable responses. In addition, 
nonreligious individuals scored significantly higher on Factor #2 than 
did Catholics and Protestants. Factor #2 was unrelated to scores 
derived from the Environmental Behavior List, and was also unrelated to 
locus of control, egocentrism, ethnocentrism, PHN positivity, socio­
economic status, the four Kameron factors, sex, race, political party 
preference and political ideology.
Factor #3: "Extraterrestial Life Unlikely vs. Likely," was re­
lated to 6 other variables (see Tables 15 and 16). Significant positive 
correlations were obtained between Factor #3 and both the Anthropocen- 
tric Behavior Score and total EBL score, as well as with Kameron factors 
#1 and #3, indicating that persons who believe that extraterrestial 
life is unlikely tend to endorse an exploitationist approach to the
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the environment, display a fear of outdoors, and report participation 
in anthropocentric behaviors as well. Factor 3 was also significantly 
associated with religion, sex, and political party preference. A belief 
that extraterrestial life is unlikely is significantly more common among 
Catholics and Protestants than among nonreligious individuals, is 
significantly more common among females than males, and is significantly 
more common among Democrats than among Independents. Factor #3 was 
unrelated to the EBL Nonanthropocentric Behavior Score, locus of control, 
egocentrism, ethnocentrism, PHN favorability, social desirability set, 
socioeconomic status, race, and political ideology.
Factor #4: "Low vs. High Concern for Animals and Plants" was
significantly positively correlated with 6 other variables, as indicated 
in Table 15. Persons who display a low concern regarding the death of 
animals and plants (high scorers on Factor 4) tend to report involvement 
in anthropocentric behaviors while denying participation in nonanthropo­
centric behaviors, are ethnocentric in outlook, endorse the exploitation 
of the environment and the growth of technology, tend to be fearful of 
the outdoors and adopt a man under and hostile toward nature position. 
Factor 4 is unrelated to social desirability, locus of control, egocen­
trism, PHN positivity, socioeconomic status, sex, race, religion, 
political ideology and political party preference.
Factor #7 "Man unique and harmless vs. Man as destructive animal" 
was related to four variables (see Tables and 16). Significant corre­
lations were obtained between Factor 7 and the Nonanthropocentric 
Behavior Score and total score from the Environmental Behavior List as 
well as with KF1. In other words, persons who view mankind as unique,
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set apart from the animal world, and nondestructive report that they 
are unlikely to perform nonanthropocentric behavior, and tend to adopt 
an exploitationist stance toward the environment. Factor 7 was also sig­
nificantly related to political ideology, with conservatives being more 
likely than liberals to view mankind as unique and harmless.
Factor #8: "Welfare of Humans vs. Welfare of Animals" was
significantly related to only two of the 18 variables examined. A sig­
nificant correlation was obtained between Factor 8 and both the Non­
anthropocentric Behavior Score and the total EBL score, indicating that 
persons who place the welfare of humans well ahead of the welfare of 
animals tend to deny involvement in nonanthropocentric behavior.
Factor #9: "Exploitation vs. Protection of the Environment,
showed significant correlations with all three EBL scores, and with 
Kameron's factors 1 and 3. In other words, persons who espouse 
exploitation of the environment tend to report anthropocentric behavior 
while denying nonanthropocentric behaviors, tend to maintain a pro­
technology stance, and endorse an exploitationist stance on Kameron's 
scale as well. Factor 9 showed no significant relations with any of the 
other variables under consideration.
Of the five continuous variables whose content is unrelated to 
environmental attitudes (locus of control, egocentrism, ethnocentrism,
PHN positivity, and socioeconomic status) only ethnocentrism was signifi­
cantly related to any of the Anthropocentrism Scale factors. Even 
ethnocentrism was significantly correlated with only two factors. Given 
this lack of relatedness between predictor and criterion variables, a 
canonical correlational analysis was deemed unnecessary.
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Correlations among variables other than those derived from 
the Anthropocentrism Scale can be located in Table 17.
Table 17
Product Moment Correlations Between All Major Variables 
Other Than Anthropocentrism Scale Variables
PHN





Locus of Control .046 .175 -.205
SocioeconomicStatus .014 .043 .272d -.062
Social
Desirability .294d .161 .310° -.161 .161
Kameron Factor 1 .074 .346c -.145 .117 .128 -.060
Kameron Factor 2 .062 .446a -.159 .102 .062 .148 .302c
Kameron Factor 3 .015 .353c -.046 .198 .216 -.085 ,601a •493a
Kameron Factor 4 .040 .272d .030 .126 .126 -.077 .463a .228 .485a
Anthropocentric 
Behavior Score .087 .045 -.183 .267d .045 -.225 .5703 .343 .541a .253d
Nonanthropocentric Behavior Score .133 -.090 .153 -.115 -.090 .308c -.546a -.216 -.4603 -.149 -.519a
Total Environmental 
Behavior List Score--.131 .080 -.187 ,234d .083 -.315c •633a ,303c .5603 .216 ,805a -.925a
Significant at the .0001 level. Significant at the .001 level. Significant at the .01 level. 
Significant at the .05 level.
DISCUSSION
Evidence regarding the construct validity of ’'anthropocen­
trism" is available from both the factor analysis of the Anthropocen­
trism Scale and the correlations between anthropocentrism and other 
constructs. First of all, a "pure anthropocentrism" factor accounting 
for nearly 20% of the variance emerged as the first factor for the 
Anthropocentrism Scale. The emergence of such a first factor supports 
the view that anthropocentrism is a useful construct which identifies 
a common thread running through a variety of attitudes regarding man­
kind's position and role in nature. Analysis of the five items which 
load highest on Factor 1 indicates that each is an abstract item which 
posits human preeminence. This value judgement maintaining that 
humans are more important than and superior to the rest of creation 
has previously been identified as the central tenet of anthropocen­
trism. Given data indicating that items which express this core 
anthropocentric value judgement have the highest item-test correlations 
(Chandler, Note 1) as well as the highest loadings on the main factor 
derived from the Anthropocentrism Scale, the utility of the construct 
"anthropocentrism" is apparent.
The relationship between anthropocentrism and various reported 
behaviors was also established in this study. Given the significant 
moderate correlations obtained between total score on the Anthropocen­
trism Scale and each of the three scores derived from the Environmental 
Behavior List, it is apparent that anthropocentric attitudes are 
related to reported behaviors. However, since the honesty and
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accuracy of subjects' reports regarding their actual behavior cannot be 
ascertained, the finding of a significant relationship between social 
desirability and total EBL Score (see Table 17) suggests that these 
self-reports be viewed cautiously. Thus, although the magnitude of 
the correlations between anthropocentrism and reported behavior is 
substantial, the measurement of actual behavior will be necessary to 
clearly establish the "behavioral validity" of anthropocentrism as a 
construct.
Correlational data in Table 11 do, nonetheless, suggest which 
types of behavior may be most likely to be associated with an anthro­
pocentric outlook. Of the 31 reported behaviors on the Environmental 
Behavior List, 12 were significantly correlated with anthropocentrism. 
Specifically, anthropocentric individuals are more likely than non­
anthropocentric individuals to report a preference for driving large 
cars, a tendency to litter, a reluctance to use busses, bicycles, or 
carpools to conserve energy, and a tendency to adjust their thermo­
stats to obtain comfort rather than to conserve energy. In addition, 
anthropocentric individuals report that they are more likely to vote 
for business oriented rather than environmentally oriented political 
candidates, less likely to subscribe to ecological publications or 
support environmental groups via financial contributions or personal 
attendance of meetings, and less likely than nonanthropocentric 
persons to deliberately purchase nonpolluting products. These re­
ported behaviors can thus serve as the starting point in the investi­
gation of the network of actual behaviors which are associated with an 
anthropocentric outlook.
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A network of hypotheses was developed relating anthropocentrism 
to a variety of hypothetical constructs as well. Perhaps the most 
striking of the findings in this regard is the significant positive 
correlation obtained between anthropocentrism and ethnocentrism. This 
finding supports the view that, from one angle, anthropocentrism can 
be seen as an extension of ethnocentric thinking. It will be recalled 
that Adorno et al. had maintained that the ethnocentric individual's 
need for an outgroup prevents formation of an identification with 
humanity as a whole. Given the obtained correlation between PHN 
Favorability (degree of positivity of attitudes toward mankind) and 
ethnocentrism (r“-.221, £<.06), it is evident at very least that 
ethnocentric individuals do not view humanity in a highly favorable 
light when asked to evaluate humanity in the absence of an outgroup. 
Such data provides some support for the contention of Adorno et al. 
However, contrary to the assumption of Adorno et al., it is possible 
to contrast man with a suitable outgroup (the nonhuman environment), 
if one transcends the intraspecies level of analysis. And, when 
provided with such an outgroup, it is clear that the ethnocentric 
individual does indeed identify with mankind as an ingroup and view 
the nonhuman environment as an outgroup to be opposed (as indicated 
by the significant positive correlation between ethnocentrism and 
anthropocentrism). Thus, a slight modification is called for in the 
dynamics of ethnocentrism proposed by Adorno et al. It now appears 
that the ethnocentric individual does not tend to identify with man­
kind as a whole, unless provided with a suitable outgroup. When 
provided with such an outgroup, the ethnocentric individual does
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indeed identify with mankind as an ingroup, and anthropocentrism there­
by becomes a natural extension of ethnocentric thinking.
The finding of a nonsignificant correlation between anthropo­
centrism and PHN Favorability indicates that these two constructs are 
separate entities, as hypothesized. In other words, one's attitudes 
toward mankind per se can be quite different from one's attitudes 
regarding the relative value of man in relation to the nonhuman environ­
ment. Again, the provision of an outgroup, against which man can be 
evaluated, has a substantial impact on the way in which a given indi­
vidual evaluates mankind. This finding of a nonsignificant relation­
ship between anthropocentrism and PHN Favorability satisfies one 
requirement for discriminant validity for the construct anthropocen­
trism.
A nonsignificant relationship was also observed between anthro­
pocentrism and egocentrism. Combined with a nonsignificant correlation 
between egocentrism and ethnocentrism, this finding suggests that the 
dynamics of ethnocentric/anthropocentric thinking cannot be extended all 
the way down to the basic ingroup "oneself." In other words, persons 
who take a self-centered approach in their relations with other indi­
viduals do not necessarily apply this self-centered approach to 
ingroup-outgroup relations (whether that outgroup be ethnic or non­
human). Given the similar findings in the 1978 Chandler study, it is 
now evident that anthropocentrism is unrelated to egocentrism, regard­
less of which facet of egocentrism one is investigating (self­
preoccupation, selfishness, or self-aggrandizement).
In regard to Kameron's factors (KFl, KF2, etc.), expectations
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that anthropocentric individuals would endorse exploitation of the 
environment and the growth of technology were clearly confirmed by the 
obtained data. Analyzing the correlations between anthropocentrism 
and all four Kameron factors, the meaning of anthropocentrism in terms 
of the man-nature value trichotomy (man over/with/under nature) can be 
determined. Given the significant positive correlations between 
anthropocentrism and all four Kameron factors, it is evident that non­
anthropocentric individuals tend to adopt a man-with-nature position, 
rejecting the man-over-nature and man-under (and hostile toward)- 
nature orientations. That is, nonanthropocentric persons tend to 
accept the man-with-nature items that lead to low scores on KF1 and 
KF2, thereby adopting a conservationist stance and a nonfearful 
approach to the environment. In addition, nonanthropocentric indi­
viduals tend to reject the man-over-nature items which are associated 
with a pro-technology stance on KF4, and tend also to reject the man- 
under (and hostile toward)-nature items of KF2. Thus, it is evident 
that nonanthropocentric individuals tend to adopt the man-with-nature 
value orientation.
On the other hand, it appears that an anthropocentric stance can 
be associated with either a man-over-nature or a man-under-nature posi­
tion. Anthropocentric individuals tend to agree with the man-over- 
nature items of KF4, thereby adopting a pro-technology stance. When 
given a choice between a man-with-nature (non-fear of outdoors) or a man- 
under-nature (fear of outdoors) position on KF3, anthropocentric individ­
uals choose the man-under-nature stance. And when given the choice of 
accepting or rejecting the man-under (and hostile toward)-nature
items of KF2, anthropocentric individuals again adopt the man-under- 
nature orientation. Thus, whereas nonanthropocentric individuals tend 
to adopt a man-with-nature equalitarian stance vis-a-vis the environ­
ment, the anthropocentric individual tends to adopt a more competitive 
view of the relation of man and nature. Man is seen as either over 
nature, and thereby able to exploit the environment via his mastery of 
technology, or man is seen as capable of being subdued by nature, with 
this perception giving rise to fear of, and hostility toward the 
environment. That is, the anthropocentric individual tends to see 
man-nature interactions as a battle for control, with man unable to 
control nature in some respects, yet capable of and entitled to exer­
cise such control in other areas. This view of the relationship 
between man and nature is reminiscent of the ethnocentric individual's 
view of ingroup-outgroup relations as a competitive battle for mastery.
In regard to locus of control, it was earlier assumed that locus 
of control would be related to man-nature value orientations, with man- 
over-nature types.maintaining an internal locus of control, and man- 
under-nature types adopting an external locus of control. It was also 
assumed that anthropocentrism would be associated solely with the 
man-over-nature position, and that anthropocentrism would therefore be 
associated with an internal locus of control. Data indicate that these 
assumptions are false on both counts. First of all, the nonsignificant 
correlations obtained (see Table 17) between locus of control and both 
KF2 (composed primarily of man-under-nature items) and KF4 (composed 
primarily of man-over-nature items) indicate that there is no consis­
tent relationship between locus of control and man-nature value
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orientations. That is, perception of locus of control in one's life 
is unrelated to one's perception of whether man or the environment 
controls the balance of power in man-nature interactions. Secondly 
as indicated above, anthropocentrism is associated with a man-under- 
nature orientation as well as a man-over-nature orientation. Given 
this unexpected finding that anthropocentric individuals see the 
balance of power (locus of control) in man-environment relations as 
being variable, it is perhaps unsurprising that anthropocentrism is 
unrelated to Rotter's internal-external locus of control variable.
However, it should be noted that small but significant posi­
tive correlations were observed (see Table 17) between locus of 
control and total EBL score as well as the Anthropocentric Behavior 
Score derived from the EBL. In other words, it is apparent that 
persons who report engaging in supposedly anthropocentric behavior 
tend to maintain an external locus of control. While the size of 
this correlation is minimal, it suggests that the relationship between 
anthropocentrism and locus of control might profitably be explored in 
greater detail. It would also be interesting to assess the relation­
ship between anthropocentrism and other types of control, such as 
tendency toward interpersonal dominance and capacity to delay gratifi­
cation (since anthropocentrism seemingly involves sacrificing the 
environment for the sake of more immediate, transient needs).
Although no significant findings emerged when the relationships 
between anthropocentrism and various demographic variables were tested, 
there are indications that further investigation of these relationships 
may also be profitable. First of all, religion was found to be
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significantly related to AF1: "pure anthropocentrism." Secondly,
the method employed herein was not designed to examine all groups, or 
to provide equal N*s for those groups which were examined within each 
of the five categorical demographic variables. As a result, the 
obtained sample size for some groups was too small to permit reliable 
generalization of findings to the populations from which these samples 
were to be drawn. Reference to Table 13 indicates that this diffi­
culty was quite marked when testing the relationships between anthro­
pocentrism and both race and religion. Given this situation, plus the 
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) findings regarding cultural differences 
in preference for various man-nature value orientations, a more power­
ful test of oultural differences in anthropocentrism may prove fruitful. 
Specifically, a cross cultural study designed to systematically assess 
anthropocentrism as a function of race, religion, and continent or 
country of residence would allow us to generalize findings beyond the 
primarily Western White Christian population examined herein.
In reviewing the various findings relevant to the construct 
validity of anthropocentrism, it is evident that "anthropocentrism" is 
a useful construct which identifies a common thread, or value, which 
permeates a variety of attitudes regarding man-nature interactions.
This construct is also significantly related to reported behavior, and 
has been shown to be closely related to the construct "ethnocentrism."
In addition, it is clear that anthropocentrism taps the level of 
importance attributed to man relative to the non-human environment.
This construct can thus be distinguished from attitudes toward 
humanity per se. as required for discriminant validity. The meaning of
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anthropocentrism in terms of man-nature value orientations (man-over/ 
under/with-nature) has also been established. Thus, a good deal can be 
said regarding the meaning of the construct anthropocentrism. However, 
as indicated by the regression analysis, the meaning of anthropocen­
trism in terms of constructs unrelated to man-nature values is largely 
unknown (only 20 percent of the variance in anthropocentrism is 
accounted for by these variables). Anthropocentrism is unrelated to 
egocentrism, locus of control, and socio-economic status. Of the 
various nonenvironmental constructs examined, only ethnocentrism has 
been found useful in illuminating the meaning of the construct anthro­
pocentrism. Thus, it would be helpful to examine the relationship 
between anthropocentrism and additional nonenvironmental variables 
(e.g., interpersonal dominance, capacity to delay gratification).
Future research might also profitably explore anthropocentrism in terms 
of actual ecologically related behaviors, cross cultural variables, 
and variables which have been shown to be associated with ethnocen­
trism and prejudice.
Regarding the validity of the Anthropocentrism Scale as an 
operational measure of anthropocentrism, the following can be said. 
First of all, it is evident that responses to the Anthropocentrism 
Scale are not significantly affected by social desirability response 
sets. Although this response bias could possibly become a problem in 
the future as the social desirability of ecological consciousness in 
our society changes, it is clear that social desirability bias is not 
a confounding variable at this time. Factor analytic data can be 
brought to bear on the question of whether there is excessive content
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specific variance built into the Anthropocentrism Scale. The emergence 
of a fairly broad "pure anthropocentrism" first factor, whose highest 
loading factors are abstract rather than concrete and specific in con­
tent, supports the view that irrelevant content specific variance is 
not extensive. On the other hand, AF3 ("extraterrestral life likely vs. 
unlikely") is clearly a highly content specific factor whose content is 
too peripheral to anthropocentrism to be given such prominence. Aside 
from this overemphasis on extraterrestial life, it appears that the 
factors derived from the Anthropocentrism Scale each tap general issues 
regarding man-nature relations, rather than irrelevant content specific 
issues. Thus, although irrelevant content specific variance may be 
excessive, it is clearly not extensive.
The more important content validity question revolves about the 
fact that the universe of possible manifestations of anthropocentrism 
remains largely unknown. Accordingly, there may be some content areas 
which are not sufficiently tapped by the Anthropocentrism Scale. Once 
the universe of manifestations of anthropocentrism is better known, 
a scale with better content validity may be obtainable. In the meantime, 
AF1 can be used as a measure of "pure anthropocentrism," given its 
emphasis on abstract rather than concrete content specific issues. The 
use of AF1 would thus complement the use of total score on the Anthro­
pocentrism Scale, which relies much more extensively on the assessment 
of specific attitudes related to anthropocentrism.
Summary
In conclusion, anthropocentrism has been established as a useful 
construct which identifies a basic value judgement, that humans are
rightfully preeminent in the natural world, as an important contribu­
tor to a variety of attitudes and reported behaviors relevant to man- 
nature interactions. This construct has been found to be closely 
related to ethnocentrism, but a need remains to tie anthropocentrism 
to other nonenvironmental constructs in order to illuminate further 
the basis for adoption of anthropocentric values and attitudes. As a 
measure of anthropocentrism, the Anthropocentrism Scale has been found 
adequate at present, though a better scale may be obtainable once the 
universe of manifestations of anthropocentrism is better delineated.
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The statements on the following pages refer to a variety of 
Issues for which different people have quite different opinions.
Please read each statement carefully, and indicate as accurately as 
possible your degree of agreement or disagreement with each statement, 
using the following scale:
+3: Strong Agreement 
+2: Moderate Agreement 
+1: Slight Agreement 
0: Neutrality; Cannot Agree or Disagree 
*■1: Slight Disagreement 
-2: Moderate Disagreement 
-3: Strong Disagreement
Place the number which best represents your personal point of view on 
the line provided to the left of each item.
_____ 1. The differences between human beings and animals are more 
numerous than the similarities.
  2. It is quite possible that highly advanced civilizations exist
in other parts of the universe.
  3. Man should control the environment for his own benefit as
much as possible.
______ 4. The human species is without a doubt the most advanced form
of life on earth.
  5. It is wrong to pick flowers for their beauty value, because
in so doing, we destroy the life of the flower.
  6. Man is the most important species on earth.
  7. It is wrong for scientists to try to find cures for human
diseases by experimentally producing these diseases in 
animals.
  8. Most animals and plants seem to be better adapted to
their environments than man is to his environment.
  9. If we eventually discover life in other parts of the universe,
such life will probably be found to be inferior to human life.
_____ 10. Humans should show more respect for the rights of animals 
and plants.
98
11. Man is better equipped to survive environmental disasters 
than any other species.
12. It is best to think of man as just one of many members of 
the animal world.
13. When driving a car, one should go out of his way to avoid 
animals crossing the road, even at the risk of an accident 
with another automobile.
14. Humans are superior to all other animals in all important 
respects.
15. It is likely that "flying saucers" are presently visiting 
earth.
16. I sometimes feel that the killing of an animal is just as 
wrong as the killing of a human being.
17. Degree of intelligence ought to be the main measure for 
determining the superiority of one species over another.
18. If there actually is an afterlife, animals are just as likely 
as humans to take part in such a life after death.
19. Protecting the environment is more important than the produc­
tion of consumer goods.
20. I prefer the benefits of city life over the benefits of life 
in the country.
21. Governments should adopt policies which ensure the survival 
of the human species, even if other species become extinct 
as a result.
22. No matter how we define "superiority," it seems that man must 
be considered superior to all known forms of life.
23. The universe would be much better off if humans did not exist.
24. I occasionally feel that it is morally wrong to eat meat.
25. If I could choose my own afterlife, I would like to be some­
thing other than a human being for a change.
26. Many animals and plants are far more advanced than most 
people like to believe.
27. I usually enjoy science fiction novels and films.
28. Sometimes my conscience prevents me from killing bothersome 
flies and insects.
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29. Man is the most significant entity in the universe.
30. The primary value of an animal or plant lies in its ability 
to serve human needs.
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APPENDIX B
Anthropocentrism Scale Standardization Dataf
Standard Item-Test Correlations
Item # Mean® Deviation” Form lc Form 2 Form 3* Mean Reliabilj
4.06 1.93 .435 .322 .383 .380 .536
28 2.30 1.51 .345 .328 .372 .348 .894
3 4.42 2.08 .558 .226 .328 .371 .570
4 6.02 1.50 .606 .496 .480 .537 .641
5® 4.77 1.88 .271 .371 .423 .355 .731
6 4.80 2.20 .697 .665 .618 .660 .394
7I 5.39 1.63 .327 .485 .230 .347 .3768S 2.85 1.82 .266 .322 .266 .285 .462
9 2.91 1.48 .313 .426 .467 .402 .617
10® 2.23 1.27 .452 .429 .456 .446 .572
11 4.42 2.00 .470 .352 .281 .368 .518
12® 3.92 2.07 .583 .470 .567 .540 .615
13® 5.37 1.70 .288 .465 .381 .378 .695
14 4.49 1.99 .642 .605 .656 .634 .451
15® 3.49 1.78 .201 .275 .301 .259 .803
16® 3.15 1.94 .298 .583 .535 .472 .717
17 3.60 2.04 .410 .409 .306 .393 .540
18® 3.69 2.14 .358 .393 .533 .428 .691
19® 2.75 1.61 .304 .260 .364 .309 .420
20 3.49 1.95 .293 .121 .355 .256 .572
21 2.88 1.77 .581 .428 .487 .305 .517
22 4.56 2.11 .637 .544 .590 .590 .708
23® 5.65 1.71 .187 .510 .294 .330 .570
24® 5.48 1.84 .276 .599 .431 .435 .747
25I 5.20 2.06 .378 .448 .303 .376 .776
U t 2.62 1.59 .439 .441 .549 .476 .68227® 3.09 1.94 .177 .341 .231 .250 .905
28g 4.95 2.16 .385 .538 .396 .440 .878
29 3.93 2.07 .706 .520 .563 .596 .622
30 2.85 1.79 .530 .239 .564 .444 .418
aSee Chandler (Note 1) for additional details
^Based on 30 item (final form of) Anthropocentrism Scale; N = 185. 
cBased on the initial 35 item form of the Anthropocentrism Scale,
.from which 5 items were later dropped; N = 53.
Based on the 32 item form of the Anthropocentrism Scale, from which 
2 items were later dropped; N ** 63.
eBased on the final form (30 items) of the Anthropocentrism Scale;
N = 185.
*Test - retest correlations; N * 63.
^Negatively phrased item whose scoring is reversed prior to applica­
tion of other statistical procedures. Raw scores range from -3 to
+3 on all items. After reversing the sign of responses to
negatively phrased items, and adding +4 to the score of each of the
30 items, item scores range from +1 to +7, with high scores being 
relatively anthropocentric.
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APPENDIX G
The Environmental Behavior List
Please read each of the following statements carefully, and 
determine whether each statement is true or false in describing your 
behavior. If a given statement is true, place a "T" on the line to 
the left of that item; if false, place an "F" on the line provided. 
Please keep your actual behavior in mind when considering each 
statement.
_____ 1. I keep track of my senators' and congressman's voting 
records on environmental issues.
_____ 2.a I have used pesticides to protect my plants when necessary.
  3. I subscribe to one or more ecological publications.
  4. I can clearly remember having bought a product specifically
because it had a lower polluting effect.
  5.a I kill cockroaches when they appear in my living quarters.
_____ 6. I go out of my way to buy products in recyclable containers, 
despite the hassle.
_____ 7. I have attended at least one meeting concerned with 
ecological or environmental issues.
  8. I save newspapers for collection during paper recycling drives.
_____ 9. Because of my beliefs regarding the effects of overpopulation,
I will limit the size of my family to two children or less.
  10.a I have used aerosol cans occasionally during the last few
years.
  11.a When possible, I prefer to drive a fairly large car rather
than an economy size car.
aIndicates an item which describes an anthropocentric behavior. 
The item is scored +1 if marked "True," 0 if marked "False," thereby 
giving rise to an anthropocentric behavior score ranging from 0 to 11. 
All other items describe nonanthropocentric behaviors. These items are 
also scored +1 if marked "True," 0 if marked "False," thereby resulting 
in a nonanthropocentric behavior score ranging from 0 to 20. The 
Total Environmental Behavior List Score is obtained by subtracting the 
nonanthropocentric behavior score from the anthropocentric behavior 
score.
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12.a When I vote, I'm more likely to support a candidate who 
supports growth of the economy and of business, than a 
candidate who supports putting controls on business in order 
to protect the environment. ,
13. I keep my thermostat set at 78 degrees or above in the summer, 
and 65 degrees or below in the winter, in order to conserve 
energy and reduce pollution.
14. I have attended an anti-nuclear power meeting.
15. I have written to a newspaper or legislator regarding the 
adverse effects of pollution.
16.a I often buy products contained in no deposit/no return bottles.
17. I can clearly remember switching products for environmental 
reasons.
18. I have at times taken a bus or bicycle across town, even 
when 1 had a car available to me, in order to reduce pollu­
tion of the environment.
19. I have been involved in at least one litter cleanup drive.
20. I have contributed money to an organization whose main task 
is to protect the natural environment.
21.a If I'm honest with myself, I have to admit that I sometimes 
throw small pieces of litter on the ground, or out of my car 
window.
22. I have at times boycotted products because they were made by 
companies found guilty of damaging the natural environment.
23. I have used a recycling center for bottles or cans at least 
once within the last year.
24.a When I think about it, I realize that I do little or nothing 
to protect or improve the environment.
25. I am willing to put a brick in my toilet in order to reduce 
its water consumption, and I will do so soon.
26.a Even though use of carpools, buses, bikes, etc. reduce pollu­
tion, I prefer the convenience of a car.
27. I have reduced my electricity consumption by 20% or more over 
the last two years.
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28. I am very willing to pay, out of my own earnings, an addi­
tional tax of 50 dollars a year, to be used specifically to 
improve the natural environment.
29.a I don't go out of my way to protect the environment, since 
that's the government's job.
30. I can remember a period in my life when I was a vegetarian 
because 1 felt it was morally wrong to eat meat.
31.a I turn on my air conditioner or heater when the temperature 




Please provide the information requested below, but do NOT 
include your name on this or any other form in the research packet. 
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Fill in the following blanks in respect to the "status person" in 
your parents' household. This person is the one regarded as "head of 
the household."
1. Education (highest level attained): _________________
2. Occupation (Exact: e.g., carpenter, bookkeeper, auto mechanic,
grade school teacher, etc.):
3. Source of Income (wages or salary, inherited money, commissions, 
stocks & bonds, etc., or any combination of these):
aScoring of socioeconomic status section (last three items above) 
was adapted from McGuire & White (1955).
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January 1980 to Present; Clinical Associate at the Runnymede Clinic, a 
private group practice in Baton Rouge. Part time (20 hrs/wk) 
duties include individual, marital, and group psychotherapy with 
adult outpatients; individual and family therapy with adolescent 
outpatients; systems consultation at a local residential unit for 
adolescent females; psychodiagnostic and neuropsychological 
(Halstead-Reitan) evaluations; and writing of testing feedback 
letters to prospective psychotherapy clients.
January 1980 to May 1980: Graduate Assistant at the Louisiana State
University Developmental Psychology Center. Duties included 
diagnostic interviews, as well as family therapy and play therapy 
with children and young adolescents.
January 1979 to January 1980: Clinical Internship at Thalians Community
Mental Health Center, Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, Los Angeles, 
California. Half-time position in the Adult Outpatient Section 
included individual and marital therapy, co-therapist of mid-life 
therapy group, intake evaluations, crisis intervention, and psycho­
diagnostic evaluations of inpatients. Also half-time on the Family 
and Child Section, involving individual and family therapy with 
adolescents and children, co-therapist of Black adolescent therapy 




September 1977 to May 1978: Practicum in psychotherapy at the Louisiana
State University Student Counseling Center. Involved individual 
and group psychotherapy, as well as psychodiagnostic evaluations, 
with student clientele.
July 1977 to May 1978: Clinical Associate at The Psychology Group, a
private group practice in Baton Rouge. Part time (20 hrs/wk) 
duties primarily involved psychodiagnostic eveluations, with some 
individual psychotherapy with adults and adolescents, and occa­
sional neuropsychological evaluations.
October/November 1977. and February/March 1978: -Co-coordinator and group 
facilitator of short term reentry groups for inmates about to be 
paroled from the Louisiana Correctional Institute for Women, St. 
Gabriel, Louisiana.
April 1977 to January 1978: Volunteer phone counselor for the Baton
Rouge Crisis Intervention Center.
Spring 1977: Psychodiagnostics Practicum, Louisiana State University.
Involved psychological evaluation of inpatients at East Louisiana 
State Hospital, Jackson, Louisiana, and inmates at the Louisiana 
Correctional Institute for Women, St. Gabriel, Louisiana.
October 1974 to May 1976: Psychometrist in the Psychological Services
Department of the Milwaukee Public School System. Involved psycho- 
educational evaluations of students from Head Start through senior 
high school, and consultation with the Head Start program.
Spring 1974; Co-therapist of therapy group for alcoholics at DePaul 
Rehabilitation Hospital, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
September 1973 to May 1974: Psychodiagnostics Practicum, Marquette
University. Involved psychodiagnostic evaluations of psychiatric 
inpatients at Lutheran Hospital, of alcoholic inpatients at DePaul 
Rehabilitation Hospital, and of children at the Marquette University 
Psychological Services Center, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
TEACHING EXPERIENCE:
Fall 1980 and Spring 1981: Instructor, Louisiana State University.
Involved full responsibility for teaching two sections of an Ado­
lescent Psychology course each semester.
Fall 1976 to Spring 1978: Graduate Assistant, Louisiana State University
Psychology Department. Duties included work as co-facilitator of 
groups in a graduate group dynamics course and occasional substitute 
lecturing, as well as administrative duties for various courses.
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Fall 1972 to Spring 1974: Teaching Assistant, Marquette University
Psychology Department. Involved teaching five sections of labs 
for the Introductory Psychology course, as well as substitute 
lecturing and administrative duties for other courses.
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Davis, S., Chandler, E., Cuyler, R., Marullo, S., Rosenkrantz, A.,
Jensen, S., and Krefft, K. The concurrent validation of a screen­
ing device for distinguishing emotional problems in college 
students. Journal of the American College Health Association.
27.(6), June, 1979, 316-320.
INTERESTS:
Clinical Interests: Multimodal psychotherapy with adults and adolescents,
including individual, group, marital, and family therapy.
Research Interests: Personality correlates of environmental attitudes;
personality interaction between couples; psychotherapy outcome 
research.
Personal Interests: Stained glass, photography, outdoor recreation,
and astronomy.
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